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INTRODUCTION
Justice Brennan could not have been more wrong.  In a famous 1977 
article for the Harvard Law Review, Justice William J. Brennan exhorted 
state courts to pick up some of the protection of individual liberties that the 
United States Supreme Court had vigorously employed during the 1960s, 
but had lately retreated from in the 1970s.1  In his “call to arms” Justice 
Brennan emphasized a fundamental cornerstone of state constitutional law: 
that states may interpret their own constitutions to afford greater protection 
of individual liberties than the United States Constitution, even when the 
constitutional provisions in question are worded identically.2  Justice 

 Associate Attorney, Arnold & Kadjan, Chicago, Illinois.  J.D., University of Minnesota 
Law School, 2004; M.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2000; B.A. Hamline 
University, 1998.  The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the Author and do 
not necessarily reflect those of Arnold & Kadjan or its clients.  The Author wishes to thank 
David W. Asp, II, Jason Greenlee, and Marlee Jansen for their assistance in earlier drafts of 
this Article, and to Justice W. William Leaphart and the Justices of the Montana Supreme 
Court for instilling a life-long appreciation of the power and beauty of state constitutions.  
1 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions & the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977); see also G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in 
Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1997) (stating that Justice Brennan’s 
“disagreement with the conservative majority on the U.S. Supreme Court gave him reason 
to encourage the development of state constitutional law”).  Justice Brennan was inviting 
state courts to protect individual liberties when the federal courts would not, but he also 
gave credit to the work that state courts were already pursuing in this task.  See Brennan, 
supra, at 495 (“[M]ore and more state courts are construing state constitutional 
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even 
more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.”).
2 See Brennan, supra note 1, at  491.  State courts repeatedly emphasize their independent 
ability afford greater protection under their own constitutions than is federally required.  
See, e.g., People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (N.Y. 1990) (“[T]his Court has not 
hesitated to interpret article I, § 12 independently of its Federal counterpart when the 
analysis by the Supreme Court in a given area has threatened to undercut the right of our 
citizens to be free from unreasonable government intrusions.”).
ANTHONY B. SANDERS2
2
Brennan focused on three areas in his article: equal protection,3 procedural 
due process protections of governmental benefits4 (often labeled the “new 
property”5), and the “specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights,”6 especially 
criminal procedure.7  In these areas state courts were “now beginning to 
emphasize the protections of their states’ own bills of rights.”8  He saw the 
development as something of recent vintage that needed to grow.  Other 
writings of the time entitled this development the “New Judicial 
Federalism.”9
Justice Brennan’s exhortation was a needed recognition of the 
importance of state constitutions in our system of federalism, and a timely 
reminder to the legal community not to forget our dual system of 
constitutionalism.10  That being said, for some inexplicable reason Justice 
Brennan completely omitted a field of state constitutional law where states 
had been actively pursuing this “New Judicial Federalism” for years.  The 
omission is truly staggering.  The field he neglected to add to the three 
mentioned above is the protection of economic liberties.  These liberties 
include the right to contract and the right to make a living, especially as 
protected through the doctrine of “economic substantive due process.”11
Justice Brennan even went so far as to suggest that this field did not exist, 
asserting “courts do not today substitute their personal economic beliefs for 
3 See id. (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962), among other cases).  
4 See id. 491-92 (“The root requirement of due process is that, except for some 
extraordinary situations, as individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is 
deprived of any significant ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interest.”).
5 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (citing Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964)).
6 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 492.  
7 See id. (noting that the incorporation of many aspects of the Bill of Rights against the 
states has been particularly strong in “the administration of the criminal justice system”).
8 Id. at 495.
9 See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977).
10
 In fact, Justice Brennan called himself “a devout believer” in “our concept of 
federalism.”  Brennan, supra note 1, at 502.  Justice Brennan was emphatically correct in 
diagnosing the lack of concern placed upon state constitutional law.  Law school 
curriculums of the time reflected the paucity of interest in state constitutional law: “Law 
schools . . . must share the blame for the failure by counsel and the courts to do justice to 
state constitutions.  The typical course in constitutional law now virtually ignores the 
existence of state constitutions.”  James C. Kirby, Jr., Expansive Judicial Review of 
Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions: The Case for Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 
241, 243, 246 (1981). Whether instruction is now better after thirty years of the “New 
Judicial Federalism” is beyond the scope of this article.
11 See infra Part I.A.
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the judgments of our democratically elected legislatures.”12  By “do not 
today” he was referencing the practices of the Supreme Court during the 
“Lochner era” where the Court utilized the Constitution’s due process 
clauses to strike down economic regulations and protect economic 
liberties.13
This last assertion ignored forty years of state courts wielding the 
doctrine of economic substantive due process in the face of the Supreme 
Court’s renunciation of the Lochner era.14  It is even more perplexing that 
Justice Brennan did not discuss this history given that its existence was no 
mystery by 1977.15  As will be discussed in detail throughout this Article, 
12
 Brennan, supra note 1, at 490-91 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).  
It might be suggested that Justice Brennan was referring to federal courts with this 
statement, but then why the complete lack of any reference to recent state court protection 
of economic liberties?
13 See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
15
 Many scholarly articles have documented the preservation of economic substantive due 
process in the state courts.  For those before 1977 see, for example, A.E. Dick Howard, 
State Courts & Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 
883 (1976) (“[N]otwithstanding the Supreme Court’s post-1937 ‘hands-off’ posture in the 
economic sphere, studies of state court decisions have made it clear that substantive due 
process has lived on in the states.”); Note, Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law, 
15 STAN. L. REV. 309, 321 (1963) (“The increasing frequency of such decisions indicates 
that economic due process is neither dead nor dying and that it is the United States 
Supreme Court, rather than the state courts, which is resisting the current drift in 
constitutional interpretation.”); John A.C. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation & 
Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 NW. U. L. R. 226, 226-27 (1958) (“Since the 
abandonment by the Supreme Court of substantive due process as a test of the validity of 
state economic regulation, there have been many conflicting decisions in the substantive 
due process field in the state courts.”); John A. Hoskins & David A. Katz, Substantive Due 
Process in the States Revisited, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 384, 386 (1957) (“These state courts 
continue to insist, as did the pre-1934 federal judiciary, that legislative enactment of state 
public policy be tempered by what the state courts believe to be desirable, effective and 
proper.”); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 
MINN. L, REV. 91, 92 (1950) (“[S]ome state supreme courts when interpreting the due 
process clause or its equivalent in their state constitutions have continued to interfere freely 
with legislative policies.”).
The fact that these numerous studies exist has not prevented more recent studies 
from ignoring post-New Deal economic substantive due process under state constitutional 
law.  See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the 
Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1412 n.5 (1998).  Shapiro cites G. ALAN TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 165-66 (1998), for the proposition that from 
1950-1969 “state courts relied on state constitutions to afford greater protection than was 
available under the [United States] constitution only 10 times.”  Id.  As this Article 
illustrates, that proposition is completely false.  It may stem from an understanding of 
rights that only encompasses those embraced by Justice Brennan, see supra notes 3-8 and 
accompanying text, and rejects economic liberties.  If that is so, it would be helpful for 
such studies to point that understanding out.
ANTHONY B. SANDERS4
4
from 1937 through to the present day, almost every state court of highest 
review has interpreted its own constitution’s due process clause, and similar 
provisions, to strike down economic regulations.  These state courts have 
done so even when explicitly acknowledging that the United States 
Supreme Court has interpreted the equivalent language in the United States 
Constitution to not extend such protection of economic liberties.16  This 
protection includes the invalidation of economic regulations in many 
different areas of economic affairs, such as occupational licensing, 
advertising, and price controls.17
Past studies of this phenomenon have covered all of these areas and 
have given a great deal of in-depth analysis of specific state court decisions 
that this Article cannot match.18  What all past studies have lacked, 
however, is a systematic attempt to catalog every economic substantive due 
process opinion under state constitutional law since the close of the Lochner 
era.  This Article does just that.  It presents every instance of a state court of 
highest review protecting economic liberties through the use of the doctrine 
of economic substantive due process, as that term is defined in Part I, under 
state constitution law since 1940.19
The absence of a full-fledged “compendium” of economic 
substantive due process cases under state constitutional law has frustrated 
attempts to more deeply inquire into how frequently states courts have 
protected economic liberty via economic substantive due process, and what 
the trends in that frequency have been.  Admitted one scholar in 1981, “[n]o 
single study has purported to collect all the state cases in this area . . . .”20
16 See especially infra Appendix A (listing all cases uncovered by this study where state 
courts have used economic substantive due process to protect economic liberties, with the 
exception of land use zoning cases); see also infra notes 172-184 and accompanying text 
(providing examples of state courts protecting economic liberties even when they 
acknowledge other courts would not).
17 See infra Part I.B.2.  
18 See, e.g., Joshua A. Newberg, In Defense of Aston Park: The Case For State Substantive 
Due Process Review of Health Care Regulation, 68 N.C. L. REV. 253, 257-59 (1990); 
Gabriella S. Tussusov, A Modern Look at Substantive Due Process: Judicial Review of 
State Economic Regulation Under the New York and Federal Constitutions, 33 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 529, 567 (1988).  
19
 Appendix A presents the complete enumeration of the relevant cases.  The inclusion of 
only state courts of highest review, which are generically referred to below as “state 
supreme courts,” instead of all state courts, is made for reasons of research convenience.  
LEXIS and WESTLAW searches of fifty courts covering sixty-five years of case law is 
long enough for one researcher.  The Author invites other scholars, but this time with an 
army of research assistants, to complete the job in the state lower courts.  He suspects, 
however, that the trends (although, obviously, not the number of cases) would not differ 
significantly.  
20
 Kirby, supra note 10, at 252; see also Tussusov, supra note 18, at 530 n.7 (“While no 
single study has attempted to collect all the state decisions illustrating state judicial 
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Another, admitting she lacked the benefit of an overall analysis data set, 
stated that “an overwhelming majority of states appear to have viable 
precedents for judicial invalidation of economic measures on due process 
grounds.”21  Not only this, but because she lacked a comprehensive set of 
cases in the area, it was reasonable of her to conclude, in 1988, that there 
was a “growing national trend on the state level toward active review” of 
economic regulation.22  This study’s data illustrate that by 1988 the actual 
trend was moving in the opposite direction.  
Pursuant to its data, this Article presents the discovery that in the 
1970s, and especially the 1980s, state court enforcement of economic 
substantive due process began to wane.  This discovery leads one to believe 
that, in spite of his omissions, perhaps Justice Brennan was on to something 
when he omitted an area of state constitutional law otherwise worthy of the 
“New Judicial Federalism.”  This does not mean that by 1977 economic 
substantive due process under state constitutional law was dead, just that it 
was about to enter a much leaner stage than before.23
This Article begins in Part I with the methodology used in 
determining when a case falls under the definition of “economic substantive 
due process” used here.  Part II opens with a brief history of the doctrine of 
economic substantive due process and of how it found favor in the Lochner 
era of the early Twentieth Century.  It then moves on to an overview of 
state court applications of economic substantive due process since 1940 and 
of the different contexts in which it has arisen.  Part III presents the state-
by-state findings of the study, summarizing the data included in the 
Appendixes and highlighting a few states that are particularly revealing of 
the trends in economic substantive due process at the state level over the 
last sixty-five years.24  Finally, in Part IV the Article addresses the question 
activism in the economic area, an overwhelming majority of states appear to have viable 
precedents for judicial invalidation of economic measures on due process grounds.”).  
21
 Tussusov, supra note 18, at 530 n.7 (emphasis added).
22
 Tussusov, supra note 18, at 567.  The Author himself was also taken in by the seductive 
allure of isolated state cases not set against a comprehensive study of trends in the law.  See 
Anthony B. Sanders, Comment: Exhumation Through Burial: How Casket Regulations 
Unearthed Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles 88 Minn. L Rev. 668, 
678 (2004) (stating that federal and state courts have recently enforced the doctrine of 
economic substantive due process to a greater degree).  The trend in lower federal courts, 
however, does appear (but, yes, only “appear”) to be on the upswing, despite the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to revive it.  See id. at 678-80 (listing recent federal cases striking down 
economic regulations under a substantive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause).
23 See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
24
 For those interested in examining the Article’s actual data, Appendix A enumerates, 
alphabetically by state, every economic substantive due process case since 1940, and 
Appendix B numerically summarizes these cases by decade and state.
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of why the rate at which state courts used economic substantive due process 
dropped so precipitously in the 1970s and 1980s.  What the Article suggests 
is that in the wake of the non-economic substantive due process case Roe v. 
Wade,25 and similar “right to privacy” cases, former defenders of the 
doctrine recognized its similarity with that underlying Roe.  These former 
defenders of economic substantive due process, and otherwise supporters of 
the free market, chose to then shy away from the doctrine instead of 
pursuing the more problematic task of distinguishing it from its non-
economic cousin.
I. DEFINING ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: WHAT IS 
INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY AND WHAT IS NOT
Before diving into the findings of this study, or presenting its 
historical background, this Part briefly outlines the study’s methodology.  
The following explains what qualifies a case to be included in the study.  
This is more complicated than it may at first appear, and is highly 
contingent on the right that a court protects, and the constitutional basis the 
court uses in protecting that right.26
A. What is Under the “Economic Substantive Due Process” Umbrella
This study is a comprehensive review of when state courts of highest 
review have struck down economic regulations through the doctrine of 
economic substantive due process under state constitutional law since 1940.  
Simply put, the study has included cases that fall under the rubric of 
Lochner era jurisprudence.  The cases that qualify for this understanding are 
25
 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
26
 A note should also be made on how the cases composing this study were discovered.  
That has been accomplished through scouring past articles on the subject, reading cases 
cited by, and those that have cited, opinions known to be economic substantive due process 
opinions, and through LEXIS and WESTLAW searches.  The searches have been of the 
form “‘police power’ w/20 unconstitutional’” and “‘due process’ w/20 unconstitutional.’”  
In addition, for states that lack an explicit “due process” clause, a search including the state 
constitution’s particular language was added.  The study does not pretend to have found 
every relevant case since 1940.  Doubtless there are cases that the Author has simply 
missed, that searches were not open-ended enough to find, or that the Author incorrectly 
judged to not fall within the definition of “economic substantive due process” used here.  
As a glance of Appendix B makes clear, the omission of a couple cases in a single state 
could indeed change the results of this study as regards that state, especially as regards 
decade-by- decade data.  However, as regards national trends over each decade, more than a 
few omissions would be needed to alter the conclusions.
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instances of state courts protecting Lockean rights of an economic nature.27
Whatever the merits of “natural rights theory,” it is these rights, i.e. the right 
to contract, to hold property, to be free from government-imposed 
monopolies, etc., that the Lochner-era court often protected.28  The 
Lochner-era court, and, indeed today’s United States Supreme Court, also 
protected other “natural rights” of a non-economic nature, but they fall 
outside of the scope of this study.29  For the sake of convenience this Article 
employs the term “economic liberties” in referring to these “natural rights 
of an economic nature.”  
For the most part the Lochner court protected economic liberties 
through the Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth amendments.  
On the whole, state courts that have struck down economic regulations on 
the grounds that they violate an individual’s economic liberties have also 
27
 This term, of course, relates back to English Enlightenment philosopher John Locke.  
Locke argued that prior to the institution of government every man has the right to preserve 
himself, and lacks the right to “take away or impair the life, or what tends to the 
preservation of life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.”  JOHN LOCKE, THE 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 6 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 
1952) (1690).  That is, without government, one has a right to one’s own life, liberty, and 
property, but not to governmental protection of them.  For a discussion of “Lockean” rights 
and their place in interpreting the United States Constitution see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS 10-18 (1985) (attempting to interpret the Takings Clause in a way “which is 
consistent with the basic Lockean design); Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the 
Police Power, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 443 (2004) (“[T]he basic concept of natural 
rights was clear: Natural or inherent rights are the rights persons have independent of those 
they are granted by government . . . .”).
28 See cases listed infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.  Some scholars, most notably 
Professor Sunstein, take the view that the Lochner-era Court was not in the business of 
protecting Lockean rights so much as enforcing the proper scope of the police power set 
against the baseline of the common law.  See, e.g. Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 (1987).  Another set have argued that Lochner era decisions 
involved the judiciary’s attempt to combat class-legislation, and not to preserve laissez-
faire.  See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE 
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE 6-10 (1993) (reviewing revisionist legal 
historians and their contentions that the courts of the time scrutinized legislation through an 
equality context).  But see Barnett, supra note 27, at 489 (stating that Gillman misses how 
“the resistance to class-based legislation was seen as a means to the protection of natural 
rights, rather than an end in itself”).  The Author notes these alternate views here, but 
contends that they do not alter which cases should be included in this study.  Whether the 
cases in Appendix A were decided in order to protect the public from special interests, or in 
order to defend the rights of certain members of the public, the end result is that the courts 
struck down economic regulations and in so doing protected economic liberties.  
29 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (right to engage in consensual 
homosexual sodomy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right of married 
couples to purchase contraception); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (right 
to learn a language of one’s choice); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 534-35
(1925) (right to educate one’s child in a private school).
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grounded their opinions in due process clauses.30  This is not entirely true, 
however.  Many, many times state courts have struck down economic 
regulations because the regulations are an illegitimate use of the “police 
power.”31  The “police power” plays a central role because the government 
will usually argue that its actions are justified under its authority to protect 
the public health, safety, welfare, and morals—otherwise known as its 
police power authority.32  This is especially true when it comes to courts 
examining local ordinances.  Often a state’s constitutional structure is such 
that a local government only possesses the powers ceded to it by the state 
legislature.33  One often-ceded power is that of promoting the public health 
and safety, or some similar area.34  A court will typically inquire into what 
this ceded “police power” encompasses and whether the challenged 
governmental action is a valid, or invalid, use of the power.35  When a court 
invalidates an economic regulation in this manner the result is the protection 
of an economic liberty.  For the same reasons this study includes cases that 
do not mention the words “police power” or “due process” at all but merely 
conclude that a regulation is “arbitrary and unreasonable,”36 or “not affected 
30 See Howard, supra note 15, at 882.
31 See, e.g., Hand v. H & R Block, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Ark. 1975) (concluding 
that franchise regulation was effectively a minimum price requirement and beyond the 
state’s police power); United Interchange, Inc. of Mass. v. Harding, 145 A.2d 9497 (Me. 
1958) (striking down bar on real estate advertising in magazines as beyond the police 
power).
32
 A typical description of the police power, and its legitimate uses, appearing in the cases 
appearing in Appendix A is the following from the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. 1958): “It requires no extensive citation of 
authorities to support the proposition that in order to justify the exercise of the police 
power the Legislature must be supported by some sound basis of necessity to protect the 
public morals, health, safety or welfare.”  Compare the very similar language from Lochner
itself: “It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police 
power by the State. . . . the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and 
appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary 
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty . . . ?”  
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
33 See, e.g., Mont. Const. art. XI §§ 4-6  (ceding limited power to local governments, 
except when a local government specially petitions for greater powers, or where the 
legislature grants them).
34 See, e.g., City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 N.W.2d 83, 84 (Iowa 1942) (noting the legislature’s 
grant of power to municipal corporations “to pass ordinances necessary for the safety, 
health, prosperity, order, comfort, convenience, etc., of its inhabitants”).
35 See, e.g., id. (characterizing ordinance as “an unreasonable restraint on a lawful 
business”).
36 See, e.g., City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ky. 1944) 
(determining ordinance preventing restaurant from opening between midnight and 4 a.m. is 
arbitrary and unreasonable); Lutz v. Armour, 151 A.2d 108, 111 (Pa. 1959) (determining 
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by a public interest.”37  The same is true for various other formulations state 
supreme courts have used to strike down economic regulations without 
citing to specific constitutional regulations.38  All of these formulations are 
used to protect Lockean economic rights, and therefore this study includes 
them.39
Lawyers whose entire experience with constitutional law consists of 
reading the United States Constitution and Supreme Court interpretations of 
it might be surprised to discover that “due process” clauses are only one of 
the provisions through which state constitutions protect economic liberties.  
Each state constitution presents, of course, a different text with different 
clauses to interpret.  Not only that, but a few state constitutions lack a “due 
process” clause entirely.40  In spite of this, since 1940, courts in all states 
lacking a due process clause have protected economic liberty through the 
use of “economic substantive due process,”41 and courts in many others 
have used constitutional clauses to protect economic liberty in addition to 
their respective due process clauses.  
The states lacking a “due process” clause usually have a “law of the 
land” clause that its highest court has interpreted as possessing an identical 
meaning to “due process.”42  In addition, some states have used other, 
that ordinance banning the importation of garbage into a town is arbitrary and 
unreasonable).
37 See, e.g., Estell v. City of Birmingham, 286 So.2d 872, 876 (Ala. 1973) (concluding anti-
scalping law to not be affected with a public interest and thus unconstitutional in the 
limitations it places on ticket resellers); Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc., 353 S.E.2d 
17, 18 (Ga. 1987) (invalidating Below Sales Cost Act because the oil industry is not 
affected with the public interest).
38 See, e.g. Dep’t of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 138 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ind. 1956) (striking 
down bar on automobile dealers also selling auto insurance on grounds that there was no 
“good cause” for the law); Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Neb. Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214, 
221 (Neb. 1974) (concluding that dairy regulation act imposing maximum costs on 
products “is an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty”); Jones 
v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 1941) (holding that ban on the advertising of 
barbering prices interferes with property rights); Whittle v. State Bd. of Exam’rs of 
Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329-30 (Okla. 1971) (concluding that licensing procedures for 
psychologist were unduly restrictive).
39
 For a full discussion of the historical understanding of the “police power” and its relation 
to the protection of natural rights, see sources cited supra in note 28.
40 See infra, note 42 and accompanying text.
41
 The only three states that have not protected economic liberty through economic 
substantive due process under state constitutional law since 1940 are Alaska, Hawai’i, and 
Rhode Island.  See infra Appendix B.  The constitutions of all three have a “due process 
clause.”  See Alaska Const. art. I § 7; Hawai’i Const. art. I § 5; R.I. Const. art. I § 2.
42 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lyons, 492 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Mass. 1986 ) (“The phrase
‘law of the land’ does not refer to the statutory law of the Commonwealth, as it exists from 
time to time.  Rather, if refers, in language found in Magna Charta, to the concept of due 
process of law.”); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa. 1975) (“It has been a 
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sometimes unique, clauses to protect economic liberties.  Since 1940 state 
supreme courts have found economic regulations unconstitutional because 
they violate Arkansas’ “Individual Liberty,”43 and anti-monopoly44 clauses, 
Kentucky’s “Absolute and Arbitrary Power” Clause,45 Montana’s “Life’s 
Basic Necessities” Clause,46 and Pennsylvania’s “Declaration of Rights,”47
to name a few.  Many cases interpreting these clauses do essentially the 
same thing: conclude that a regulation impermissibly violates an 
individual’s economic liberties.48
For the sake of convenience, the rest of this Article refers to 
“economic substantive due process” in referring to economic substantive 
due process itself and the similar bases outlined above, including other 
constitutional clauses interpreted to protect economic liberties, “police 
power” cases, and “arbitrary and unreasonable” cases.
B. What is not Included in This Study
Although this study includes cases where state supreme courts have 
protected economic liberties under due process clauses, it purposely does 
not include many other cases where state supreme courts have done much 
the same thing under other clauses.  A court may strike down an economic 
regulation on, of course, a variety of constitutional grounds.  For instance, 
federal courts may employ the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and 
long-standing tenet of Pennsylvania jurisprudence that ‘the law of the land’ in Article I, 
Section 9 is synonymous with ‘due process of law.’”).
43 McCastlain v. R. & B. Tobacco Co., 411 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ark. 1967) (determining 
regulation requiring cigarette wholesaler to obtain letter of credit to offend the state 
constitution’s  Individual Liberty Clause).
44
 North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 184 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Ark. 1944) 
(striking down taxi licensing scheme as a violation of state constitution’s anti-monopoly 
clause).
45
 Remote Services, Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1989) (striking down 
minimum mark-up law as facially unconstitutional under “Absolute and Arbitrary Power” 
Clause).
46 Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996) (invalidating, under a strict 
scrutiny analysis, rule forbidding state employed property appraiser from working as an 
independent realtor as violating right “to pursue life’s basic necessities”).
47
 Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 72 (Pa. 1940) (declaring Fair Sale Act 
unconstitutional under state Declaration of Rights).
48
 An early article concerning economic substantive due process in state courts since the 
demise of the Lochner era also lumped together “due process” cases proper, and those 
protecting economic liberties through similar constitutional clauses.  Paulsen, supra note 
15, at 93 n.10 (“Throughout this article the phrase ‘due process’ has been used to refer to 
clauses in state constitutions which are phrased differently from the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as those which are identical to it. . . . Whatever the wording these 
clauses . . . have placed unspecified general limitations on legislative power.”). 
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Fourteenth Amendments, but they also have at their disposal the Equal 
Protection Clause,49 the Takings Clause,50 and the Contracts Clause.51  State 
courts have utilized equivalents of all of these examples in striking down 
economic regulations.52  However, just as they are under the United States 
Constitution, state court interpretations of these various constitutional 
provisions are historically distinct from the doctrine of economic 
substantive due process.  To include such clauses in this study would turn 
the Article into a demonstration of how state courts protect economic 
liberties at large, and not the more-focused question of how the 
underpinnings of the Lochner court have survived to this day under state 
constitutional law.  
This study also does not include some instances of state supreme 
courts striking down economic regulations under what might be labeled 
substantive applications of a due process clause.  One example is statutory 
caps on tort damages.53  They are not examples of the protection of Lockean 
rights but of the protection of governmental procedural guarantees.  
Therefore, they fall outside the scope of this study.
Additionally, this study largely excludes review of local 
governmental land use zoning decisions.  The reason for the exclusion is 
that courts often treat due process challenges to local land use zoning 
decisions quite differently from review of other economic regulations.  
Instead of a deferential rational basis test, where the regulation at issue is 
heavily presumed to be constitutional, when it comes to land use zoning 
courts often apply a mere “clear and convincing evidence” presumption.54
This is much less demanding than the traditional “rational-basis test.”55  The 
49
 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 14 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
50
 U.S. Const. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”).
51
 U.S. Const. art. I § 10 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of 
contracts.”).
52 See, e.g., Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Co., 475 P.2d 679 (Haw. 1970) (state equal 
protection clause); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 785 (Mich. 2004) 
(state takings clause); Clem v. Christole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 780 (Ind. 1991) (state contracts 
clause).
53
 Patricia J. Chupkovich, Comment: Statutory Caps: An Involuntary Contribution to the 
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis or a Reasonable Mechanism for Obtaining 
Affordable Health Care?, 9 CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 337, 352-53 (1993) (discussing 
cases).
54 See, e.g., La Salle Nat. Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1957) 
(“A zoning ordinance is presumptively valid, this presumption may be overcome only by 
clear and convincing evidence.”).
55 See, e.g., R.L. Jordan Co. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000) 
(adopting the deferential standard of “[w]hether [the statute being challenged] bears a 
reasonable relationship to any legitimate interest of government”).
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affinity for applying economic substantive due process to land use zoning 
even extends to the federal courts.  Although the United States Supreme 
Court has not done so, many federal district and circuit courts, even in 
recent years, have overturned land use zoning decisions on Fourteenth 
Amendment economic substantive due process grounds.56  These decisions 
do apply the federal rational basis test, but nonetheless often result in the 
invalidation of the questioned regulation.  Regarding this strange quirk in 
constitutional law, one commentator has noted that “federal courts have 
allowed economic substantive due process—an endangered species of 
constitutional doctrine—to escape extinction (and in some instances even to 
flourish) within the ecosystem that is land development law.”57  Including 
land use zoning decisions in this study would therefore mix different 
doctrines together, similarly to including equal protection or takings cases.  
It would not yield a representative account of recent trends in the doctrine 
of economic substantive due process.
This is not to say that all “zoning” cases were excluded from this 
study.  Just because a court or city council labels a regulation as “land use” 
or “zoning” does not mean it is a regulation that courts treat differently in 
economic substantive due process challenges.  For instance, included is the 
Pennsylvania case Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment.58
There, the local government sought to ban the operation of all quarries in a 
township.59  Such a total exclusion is more akin to a ban on the practice of 
an occupation60 than, for example, a decision to zone a plot of land as 
residential rather than commercial.61  Because these “zoning” decisions are 
more akin to economic substantive due process cases in the non-zoning 
arena, this study includes them.62
56 See Robert Ashbrook, Comment: Land Development, the Graham Doctrine, & the 
Extinction of Economic Substantive Due Process, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1255, 1257 (2002).
57 Id.
58
 228 A.2d 169, 182 (Pa. 1967).
59 See id. at 172.
60 See, e.g., Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 453 P.2d 82, 87 (Kan. 1969)
(holding that the absolute prohibition of “huckstering and peddling” is beyond the police 
power).
61 See, e.g., Lake County v. MacNeal, 181 N.E.2d 85, 92, (Ill. 1962) (determining that 
zoning of lakeside property to be residential is not reasonably related to “the public health, 
safety, welfare or morals”).
62
 Other examples include U.S. Mining & Exploration Natural Res. Co. v. City of 
Beattyville, 548 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ky. 1977) (holding that a coal tipple may not be 
completely prohibited); State v. Brown, 108 S.E.2d 74, 78 (N.C. 1959) (striking down 
restrictions on operation of junk yards on the grounds that the law was only justified on 
aesthetic grounds, and such grounds are not enough to invoke the police power), overruled 
by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 1982).  Also included are cases involving 
state government (as opposed to local government) land use zoning regulations.  See, e.g., 
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II. BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF FALL OF LOCHNER AND HOW THE 
DOCTRINE SURVIVED IN STATE COURTS
The roots of the story of economic substantive due process under 
state constitutional law trail back to the founding of the Republic and 
beyond.  Rather than belabor a history already voluminously treated 
elsewhere in the literature this Part notes only the essential highlights.63  It 
then provides an overview of economic substantive due process under state 
constitutional law since the New Deal, focusing on some of the areas of 
economic life where state courts have been particularly active in applying 
the doctrine.
A. Early Protections of Economic Liberty and the Lochner Era
At least since Justice Chase’s dictum in Calder v. Bull, American 
courts have recognized the principle of judicial review in interpreting the 
economic policies of legislatures.64  In the years preceding the Civil War, 
whether in the guise of due process clauses, takings clauses, contracts 
clauses, or other provisions of the United States Constitution and the 
constitutions of the several states, federal and state courts frequently struck 
down economic regulations as infringing the People’s economic liberties.65
The opportunity for protection of economic liberties greatly expanded after 
the Civil War with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
Privilege or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection clauses.66  After 
the narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in The 
Slaughterhouse Cases of 1872, it appeared that the Fourteenth Amendment 
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (holding that denial of permit under the 
state Wetlands Act violates substantive due process).
63 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 560-86 (2d ed. 1988);
Gillman, supra note 28, passim.
64
 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (stating that it 
would offend “all justice and reason” to allow a legislature to take from A and give to B).
65 See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 312 n.20 (“Before the Civil War the due process clauses 
of state constitutions were frequently used to invalidate actions of the legislatures which 
would now be called adjudicative in character. . . . Thus due process came to mean that the 
courts would not enforce any legislation which was not prospective in character and 
general in application.”); Paulsen, supra note 15, at 93 (“The doctrine of substantive due 
process was not invented in 1890 by the federal courts.  Clear traces of the concept can be 
found in state court opinions applying state constitutional provisions before the Civil 
War.”).
66 See Kimberly c. Shankman & Roger Pilon, 3 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 1, 3 (1998) 
(discussing the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the protections that grew out 
of it).
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would not be read expansively so as to protect the American citizenry’s 
economic liberties.67  However, by 1887 it was becoming clear that the 
Supreme Court was open to a more expansive reading of the Due Process 
Clause,68 and in 1897, with Allgeyer v. Louisiana,69 the Court opened a 
forty-year period of regularly protecting economic liberties through a 
substantive reading of that clause.70  The most famous of these opinions, 
Lochner v. New York,71 gave the period its name: the Lochner era.
The United States Supreme Court was not alone in this enterprise.  
Various state supreme courts led the way in this post-Civil War endeavor, 
striking down economic regulations when the courts judged that they 
violated the economic liberties retained by the people and protected by state 
constitutions.72  Once the Lochner era was underway, the two levels of 
judiciary worked hand-in-hand, with state courts protecting economic 
liberties through both the United States Constitution and their respective 
state constitutions.73
Then, at least as abruptly as it began, the Lochner era came to an 
end.  In 1934, while upholding a milk price-support law, the Court in 
Nebbia v. New York articulated that as long as a rational basis existed for an 
economic regulation it was not its business to determine it 
unconstitutional.74  Then, in 1937, the Court signaled the end of substantive 
due process review in West Coast Hotel by concluding that it was within the 
state’s police power authority to enact minimum wage legislation, 
overruling the precedent of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital that it had relied 
67 SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1873) (defining the “Privileges or 
Immunities” of American citizens to merely consist of the right to travel to the nation’s seat 
of government, use navigable waters, and various other narrow rights).
68 See Mulger v. Kansas 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (stating that although the liquor 
regulation at issue was constitutional, mentioning in dicta that courts must come to their 
own conclusions on whether legislation is a proper exercise of the police power).
69
 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897).
70 See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 917, 919 (1999) (discussing the use of economic substantive due 
process from the 1890s through the 1930s).
71
 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
72 See, e.g., In the Matter of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 112-115 (N.Y. 1885) (restrictions on cigar 
making); Millett v. People, 7 N.E. 631, 636 (1886) (requirement that coal-mining contracts 
be regulated by weight).
73
 State court opinions of the time include State v. Goldstein, 93 So. 308, 314 (Ala. 1922) 
(price-control measure); State v. Legendre, 70 So. 70, 71 (La. 1915) (firemen working 
hours).  Federal opinions include New State Ice, Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 277 
(1932) (state-imposed ice vendor monopoly); Louis K. Liggett, Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 
105, 113 (1928) (pharmacy ownership restriction); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 
525, 562 (1923) (minimum wage law for women); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 
(1915) (bar on employers forbidding union membership).
74
 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1934).
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upon only a year earlier.75  The Court has not struck down an economic 
regulation on substantive due process grounds since West Coast Hotel.76
It was perhaps not immediately apparent after 1937 that this new 
deference would allow no practical opportunity to strike down economic 
regulations under a substantive reading of the Due Process Clause.77  After 
all, even if the new “rational basis” review made it harder to protect 
economic liberties, it was by no means an outlandish proposition to argue 
that such a possibility still existed.  Soon, however, that view grew much 
harder to maintain.  In 1941, in upholding a Nebraska regulation limiting 
the price employment agencies may charge their customers, Justice Douglas 
announced for the Court, “There is no necessity for the state to demonstrate 
before us that evils persist despite the competition which attends the 
bargaining in this field.”78  The only constitutional limits on the legislation 
were notions of policy and “[s]ince [the notions] do not find expression in 
the Constitution, we cannot give them continuing vitality as standards by 
which the constitutionality of the economic and social programs of the 
states is to be determined.”79  Following this black-and-white language,80 in 
the next two decades, and up through the present day, the Court has resisted 
any urge to bring back some of the life of Lochner, instead emphatically 
concluding that it will not sit as a “superlegislature” in judging the wisdom 
of economic regulations.81
B. Persistence in the State Courts after the Lochner Era
For whatever reason, the state courts didn’t get the memo.  From 
1937 until now, state courts have continued to protect economic liberty 
through applying substantive due process to economic regulations.  In 
75
 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).  The case from one year before, 
the last instance of the Court protecting economic liberty through economic substantive due 
process, was Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo.  298 U.S. 587, 609 (1936).
76
 Tussusov, supra note 18, at 536.  
77 See Note, supra note 15, at 315 (arguing that the rational basis analysis offered by 
Nebbia and West Coast Hotel was interpreted by some courts to merely mean a more 
deferential level of scrutiny, not abandonment of economic substantive due process).
78
 Olson v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941).
79 Id. at 247.
80
 As one commentator put it, after such a statement “[s]tate courts could no longer 
legitimately claim that any form of trade regulation violated fourteenth amendment due 
process . . . .”  Note, supra note 15, at 316.  
81
 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963).  The Court often has left open the 
possibility, however nominal, that it could strike down an economic regulation if it truly 
were irrational.  See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955); Sanders, 
supra note 15, at 672-73 (arguing that the Supreme Court has continued to leave open the 
possibility, following the method of Lee Optical and not Ferguson.).
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addition to utilizing the various constitutional methods discussed earlier,82
state courts have often concluded that a regulation violates the United States 
Constitution as well.  They have done so even after the Supreme Court 
made it crystal clear that this would constitute an incorrect application of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.83
1. The Inability of State Courts to Let Go
Although this Article concerns state constitutional law, it is worth 
briefly reviewing state court use of the Fourteenth Amendment in protecting 
economic liberty since 1940.84  As is quite common in much constitutional 
litigation in state courts, many cases consider whether a statute violates the 
state and United States constitutions.85  If a state court concludes, as they 
often have in the decades following 1937,86 that a law violates both 
constitutions there exists a presumption that the case may not be appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court.  This is because reversing the holding on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds would not change the fact that the law is 
still unconstitutional on “adequate and independent” state constitutional 
grounds.87  Therefore, state courts are generally insulated in concluding that 
an economic regulation violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause as long as they similarly conclude when interpreting the state 
constitution.  
These insulated holdings give us a glimpse into the mindset of state 
justices in the years following the close of the Lochner era.  Many of these 
cases relied upon the most “infamous” Lochner era opinions, including 
82 See supra Part I.A.
83 See, e.g., infra Part I.B.2.a (describing state court invalidation of fair trade acts after the 
United State Supreme Court had concluded they did not violate economic substantive due 
process).
84
 The relevant language of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. 14 
§ 1.
85
 This is because counsel often raise both federal and state constitutional arguments or 
defenses.  See Kirby, supra note 10, at 252 (“[C]onstitutional challenges to economic 
regulations can be, and usually are, made on both state and federal constitutional 
grounds.”).
86 See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
87 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983).  Under Long, there exists the 
possibility the United States Supreme Court may grant review when a state court may 
ostensibly strikes down a law under its own constitution, but the interpretation is so reliant 
on federal law that “it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relief upon an 
adequate and independent state ground . . . .”  Id.  See also Kirby, supra note 10, at 243 
(stating adequate and independent state grounds standard); Tussusov, supra note 18, at 530 
n.6 (discussing an arguable reversal of the presumption in Long).
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Liggett v. Baldridge,88 New State Ice v. Lieberman,89 and even Lochner 
itself.90  The state justices knew, of course, about the renunciation of the 
method of these cases in opinions such as West Coast Hotel,91 Olson v. 
Nebraska,92 Lee Optical,93 and Ferguson.94  It appears, however, that they 
just did not care.  They relied on these Lochner era precedents not just as 
persuasive authority in interpreting their own state constitutions, but in 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.  In case after case, state courts 
played the part of an ostrich, burying their heads in the pages of pre-1937 
case reporters and proceeding as though these Lochner era precedents were 
still “good law” in interpreting the United States Constitution.
But under state constitutions, good law they often were.  As 
discussed in more detail below, in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s the highest 
courts of appeal in almost every state struck down state statutes and local 
ordinances as violating economic substantive due process.95  The number of 
cases where a state supreme court protected economic liberty through use of 
the doctrine in the 1950s actually exceeded—far and away exceeded—the 
number of similar cases of the 1940s.96  Furthermore, the number of cases 
in the 1960s was less than that of the 1950s, but equaled that of the 1940s.97
Thus, thirty years after the United States Supreme Court had emphatically 
stated that it was not in the business of protecting economic liberties 
through economic substantive due process, the supreme courts of many 
88
 278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928).  Post-1940 citations to Liggett by a state court using economic 
substantive due process to protect economic liberty include City and County of Denver v. 
Thrailkill, 244 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Colo. 1952);. Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 
635 (Ind. 1952).
89
 285 U.S. 262, 277 (1932).  Similar citations to New State Ice include General Electric 
Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (Or. 1956); In re Aston Park, 193 S.E.2d , 729, 735 (N.C. 
1973).
90
 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).  Other examples include Edwards v. State Board of Barber 
Examiners, 231 P.2d 450, 453 (Ariz. 1951); State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 44 
N.E.2d 972, 980 (Ind. 1942).
91
 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937); see supra notes 75-76 and 
accompanying text.  
92
 313 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941); see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
93
 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955).
94
 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963).
95 See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text; see also Appendix A (listing economic 
substantive due process cases since 1940 by state).
96 See infra discussion, notes 136-137 and accompanying text; Appendix B.
97 See infra notes 136-137; Appendix B.  In 1963 a commentator could confidently (and, at 
that time, correctly) assert that, “The increasing frequency of [economic substantive due 
process] decisions indicates that economic due process is neither dead nor dying and that it 
is the United States Supreme Court, rather than the state courts, which is resisting the 
current drift in constitutional interpretation.”  Note, supra note 15, at 321.
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states either ignored or openly thumbed their nose at the new jurisprudence 
of the highest court in the land.
This level of defiance did not last forever, although it continues 
today at a much-diminished frequency.  The number of cases where state 
supreme courts protected economic liberties through applying economic 
substantive due process in the 1970s fell considerably when compared to 
the 1960s, and by the 1980s only a handful of states continued to strike 
down economic regulations on substantive due process grounds, and then 
only on occasion.98  Some states repudiated their earlier adherence to 
Lochner era protections of economic liberties,99 while in others a 
heightened degree of protection still stands as good law, but is rarely called 
upon.100  For reasons that are a bit unclear, but briefly examined below, the 
adherence to Lochner era protection of economic liberties could not sustain 
itself at such a strong level for more than three decades after West Coast 
Hotel.101
It is important to note that although the level of protection afforded 
by state courts since 1937 has greatly exceeded that of the modern United 
States Supreme Court, there are few examples of state supreme courts 
striking down economic regulations with the regularity that the United 
States Supreme Court did during the Lochner era.  Although scholars have 
greatly inflated the “activism” of the pre-1937 Court over the years,102 the 
Court regularly struck down economic regulations on substantive due 
process grounds at the rate of just over one per year.103  Since 1940 only the 
1950s Florida Supreme Court has approached that level of activity.104
2. Areas of Protection Extended Under State Economic Substantive 
Due Process 
98 See infra Appendix B.
99
 See states discussed supra Part III.B; see also David Smith, Economic Substantive Due 
Process in Arizona: A Survey, 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 327,341 (stating that the Arizona Supreme 
Court has adopted a “rational basis test” in examining economic substantive due process 
claims).
100
 See states discussed supra Part III.A.
101 See infra Part IV (hypothesizing that the rise of the United State Supreme Court’s “right 
to privacy” jurisprudence undermined support for economic substantive due process).
102 See Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process 
Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1080 (1997) (documenting that the number of state 
regulations invalidated under economic substantive due process during the Lochner era was 
a total of fifty-five and not the 200 claimed elsewhere).
103 See id.
104 See infra Appendix B; Part III.A.1 (discussing the Florida Supreme Court’s heavy use 
of economic substantive due process when compared to other state courts of highest 
review).
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Since 1940, the year the research underlying this Article begins, 
state supreme courts have used economic substantive due process to protect 
economic liberty in all manner of areas of economic life.  The examples 
range from bans on frog gigging105 to price controls on cigarettes.106  The 
reach of the cases is so wide-ranging that it is difficult to categorize all of 
them into discrete subject areas.  Nevertheless, a few subjects stand out.  To 
gain a full appreciation for the breadth and impact of the material 
underlying the trends discussed below in Part III, the remainder of this 
Section outlines a few areas where state courts have been particularly active 
in applying the doctrine of economic substantive due process.  These areas 
are state fair trade acts, advertising restrictions, price controls, occupational 
licensing, and Sunday closing laws.
a. Fair Trade Acts
More than any other area, the state court treatment of fair trade acts 
stands out as an example of the “New Judicial Federalism” in the economic 
substantive due process arena.  Legislation generally known as “fair trade 
acts” allowed suppliers of goods “sold under a trademark, trade name, or 
brand name to regulate by contract the price at which their products were 
sold at retail.”107  What often undermined the acts’ constitutionality was the 
inclusion of a “nonsigner clause” which allowed a supplier to sue a seller 
for trading for less than the contract price even if the seller was not a party 
to the contract.108  In 1936, in the twilight of the Lochner era, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld Illinois’ fair trade act as constitutional under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.109  However, between 1940 and 1975, when 
Congress amended the Sherman Act so as to once again110 prohibit such 
105 See City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1083 (La. 1978) (declaring that ban 
on frog gigging for eleven months out of the year violates substantive due process).
106 See Serrer v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 76 N.E.2d 91, 91 (Ohio 1947) (determining that 
Unfair Cigarette Sales Act does not take into account different operating costs amongst 
wholesalers and therefore violates substantive due process).
107
 Robert H. Jerry, II & Reginald L. Robinson, Statutory Prohibitions on the Negotiation 
of Insurance Agent Commissions: Substantive Due Process Review Under State 
Constitutions, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 803 (1990).
108 See id.  Even though not a signer, if the trademark holder wished to enforce the contract 
price the nonsigning reseller would have to have knowledge of the contract.  See Howard, 
supra note 15, at 883 n.46.
109
 Old Dearborn Co. Distrib. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936).  
110
 Originally, the Supreme Court had concluded that contracts between wholesalers and 
retailers fixing the price sold to consumers were a “restraint of trade” and violated the 
Sherman Act.  See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400, 
407-09 (1911)  Much later, Congress amended the law to allow states to provide for such 
contracts.  See Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937).  In 1975, Congress changed its 
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state legislation, at least twenty-one state supreme courts struck down fair 
trade acts on economic substantive due process grounds.111  Interestingly, 
the history of judicial invalidation of fair trade acts is evidence of the 
acceleration of economic substantive due process under state constitutional 
law even as the country moved away from the New Deal.  By 1956 only
four states had declared such legislation unconstitutional under economic 
substantive due process.112  Again, by 1975 that number had grown 
exponentially.
b. Advertising Restrictions
Almost as many state supreme courts have used economic 
substantive due process to invalidate state restrictions on advertising, 
particularly the advertising of prices.  The state courts decided most of the 
relevant cases before the United States Supreme Court recognized that the 
First Amendment protects commercial speech.113  Therefore, today state 
courts would find many of the regulations at issue in these cases 
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, and can avoid the 
mind, and re-enacted the prohibition.  See Consumer Goods Pricing Act, 89 Stat. 801 
(1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (2004)); see also Jerry & Robinson, 
supra note 107, 802-03 (discussing congressional history).
111 See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 147 So.2d 797, 799 (Ala. 1962); Union 
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., 275 S.W.2d 455, 461 (Ark. 1955); Olin 
Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d 139, 152 (Colo. 1956); Miles Labs., Inc. v. 
Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954); Cox v. Gen. Elec. Co., 85 S.E.2d 514, 519 (Ga. 
1955); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Am. Buyers Corp., 316 S.W.2d 354, 361 (Ky. 1958); Opinion of 
the Justices, 132 A.2d 47, 49 (Me. 1957); Loughran v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco 
Co., 12 A.2d 201, 207 (Md. 1940); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman’s Tool Shop Sporting 
Goods Co., 54 N.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Mich. 1952); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. 
Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 359 P.2d 644, 654 (Mont. 1961); McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & 
Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 721-22, 68 N.W.2d 608, 618 (Neb. 1955); Zale-Las Vegas, 
Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 396 P.2d 683, 693 (Nev. 1964); Skaggs Drug Center v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 315 P.2d 967, 974 (N.M 1957); Bulva Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib., Inc., 206 
S.E.2d 141, 151 (N.C. 1974); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 147 
N.E.2d 481, 484 (Ohio 1958); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297, 303 
(Okla. 1961); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (Or. 1956); Commonwealth v. 
Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 72 (Pa. 1940); Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 99 S.E.2d 665, 672 
(S.C. 1957); Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345 P.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Wa. 1959); Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co., 103 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W.Va. 1958); Bulova Watch Co. 
v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 420-21.  Prior studies have contended that 
a full majority of states supreme courts did so since 1936.  See Howard, supra note 15, at 
883 (citing 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ¶ 6041 (Mar. 15, 1976)).  This, of course, may be 
correct as the present study only begins in 1940.
112 See Howard, supra note 15, at 883.
113 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
757 (1976).
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“Lochner label” by instead applying the commercial speech doctrine.114
The pre-commercial speech cases themselves usually involved very little 
discussion, if any, of free speech, and instead emphasized property rights 
and the arbitrariness of governmental power.115  At least fifteen state 
supreme courts have struck down advertising regulations since 1940 on 
state economic substantive due process grounds.116  Many involve whether 
gas stations may advertise prices,117 and several others concern advertising 
by specific occupations.118
c. Price Controls
114 Compare Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980) (demanding a “substantial” governmental interest to justify the regulation) 
with Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 1962) (holding regulation 
banning the advertising of prescription drugs to have no rational basis).  Had Central 
Hudson been available to the Stadnik court, it would not have had to justify the invalidation 
of the regulation through using the rational basis test.
115 See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Justus, 161 So.2d 747, 749 (La. 1964) (striking down ban 
on advertising gasoline prices as restriction violates substantive due process); Levy v. 
Pontiac, 49 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mich. 1951) (striking down restriction on the size of 
gasoline price signs as violating substantive due process).
116 See, e.g., Ala. Indep. Serv. Station Ass’n v. McDowell, 6 So.2d 502, 507 (Ala. 1942); 
Mott’s Super Markets, Inc. v. Frassinelli, 172 A.2d 381, 386 (Conn. 1961); State v. 
Hobson, 83 A.2d 846, 858-59 (Del. 1951); State ex rel. Walters v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d 
19, 20-21 (Fla. 1958); Needham v. Proffit, 41 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ind. 1942); Sears, Roebuck 
and Co. v. City of New Orleans, 117 So.2d 64, 66 (La. 1960); United Interchange, Inc. of 
Mass. v. Harding, 145 A.2d 94, 97 (Me. 1958); Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 
311 A.2d 242, 252 (Md. 1973); Levy v. Pontiac, 49 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mich. 1951); State 
v. Redman Petroleum Corp., 360 P.2d 842, 845, 846 (Nev. 1961); State v. Boston Juvenile 
Shoes, 288 A.2d 7, 11 (N.J. 1972);  Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 1941); 
Little Pep Delmonico Rest., Inc. v. Charlotte, 113 S.E.2d 422, 423 (N.C. 1960), overruled 
by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 1982); Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 
(Ohio 1941); Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 490, 495 (Pa. 1971); Pride 
Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Utah 1962).
117 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 12 A.2d 192, ___ (Conn. 1940) (concluding that prohibition on 
gas station price signs is unconstitutional); State ex rel. Walters v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d 
19, 20-21 (Fla. 1958); Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Utah 
1962) (concluding that restriction on the placement of gas price signs violates the right to 
own and enjoy property).
118 See, e.g., Amsel v. Brooks, 106 A.2d 152, 158 ( Conn. 1954) (concluding restriction 
on dental advertising has no reasonable relation to the public welfare); Needham v. Proffit, 
41 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ind. 1942) (concluding that ban on print advertisements of funeral 
directors and embalmers is unconstitutional); Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 
1941) (holding that ban on the advertising of barbering prices interferes with property 
rights).
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Invalidating regulations on prices, whether in striking down 
minimum wage laws119 or in nullifying price supports for commodities,120
was a bread-and-butter practice of the Lochner-era Court.  Unsurprisingly, 
such behavior has also characterized state constitutional protection of 
economic liberties since 1940.  At least nineteen state supreme courts have 
concluded that certain controls on prices violate economic substantive due 
process under their respective state constitutions.121  The United States 
Supreme Court concluded in Nebbia that price supports are constitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as long as they are 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.122  In concluding 
otherwise under their own constitutions, state courts have often ignored 
Nebbia, sometimes explicitly adopting the reasoning of Justice 
McReynolds’ dissenting opinion.123  This is not to say that state courts have 
brazenly invalidated price controls across the board.  For example, in many 
of the cases involving prohibitions on sales below cost—the sale of an item 
for less than its original purchase price—courts have carefully held that 
sales below cost may be made illegal, but only when the seller has the 
“predatory intent” to undermine a competitor.124
119 See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609 (1936); Adkins v. 
Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923).
120 See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (gasoline prices).
121 See, e.g., Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Ark.1996); 
Edwards v. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 231 P.2d 450, 453-54 (Ariz. 1951); State Bd. of 
Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 254 P.2d 29, 36 (Cal. 1953); Mott’s Super Mkts., 
Inc. v. Frassinelli, 172 A.2d 381, 386 (Conn. 1961); Batton-Jackson Oil Co., Inc. v. 
Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 (Ga. 1986); Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 637 
(Ind. 1952); State ex rel. Anderson v. Fleming Co., 339 P.2d 12, 18 (Kan. 1959); Remote 
Servs., Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1989); City of Lafayette v. Justus, 161 
So.2d 747, 749 (La. 1964); Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A.2d 289, 291 (Me. 1956); 
Traveler’s Indemnity Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 265 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Mass. 1970); Gillette 
Dairy, Inc. v. Neb. Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Neb. 1974); Serrer v. Cigarette 
Service Co., 76 N.E.2d 91, 91 (Ohio 1947); Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538, 544 (Okla. 
1949); Richbourg’s Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1967), 
overruled by R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 
2000); San Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 297 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1957); State v. 
Wender, 141 S.E.2d 359, 363 (W.Va. 1965), overruled by Hartsock-Flsher Candy Co. v. 
Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144, 150 (W.Va. 1984).
122 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1934).
123 Gwynette v. Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 679 (S.C. 1960) (stating that the court agreed with 
the Nebbia dissent’s contention that prices may only be regulated if the industry is affected 
with the public interest), overruled by R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 
527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000).
124 See, e.g., Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Ark.1996) 
(striking down, as a violation of substantive due process, an anti-predatory pricing law that 
failed to require a showing of predatory intent); State ex rel. Anderson v. Fleming Co., 339 
P.2d 12, 18 (Kan. 1959) (declaring milk sales law unconstitutional where legislation 
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d. Occupational Licensing
More than in any other field, except perhaps for review of local land 
use regulation,125 state courts in the post-Lochner era have utilized 
economic substantive due process to protect the right to make a living.  
State supreme courts have invalidated licensing laws outright (including 
those extending exclusive monopolies or completely banning certain 
professions),126 or have determined them to be too restrictive because they 
require unreasonable prerequisites in order to gain a license.127  Overall, 
thirty state supreme courts, three-fifths of the several states, have protected 
the right to make a living through nullifying licensing or pseudo-licensing 
laws.128  Many courts did so in the 1940s, still perhaps believing that the 
criminalized selling below cost even when the seller lacked the intent to sell below cost); 
Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538, 544 (Okla. 1949) (striking down law banning below-
cost sales as violating substantive due process because the law included sales made without 
intent to harm competitors).
125
 As explained above, the invalidation of local land use decisions are not included in this 
study.  See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of No. Little Rock, 184 S.W.2d 52, 54 
(Ark. 1944) (striking down taxi licensing scheme as a violation of state constitution’s anti-
monopoly clause). 
127 See, e.g., Cleere v. Bullock, 361 P.2d 616, 621 (Colo. 1961) (concluding licensing 
scheme requiring funeral directors to be qualified embalmers to be beyond the police 
power).
128 See, e.g., Lisenba v. Griffin, 8 So.2d 175, 177 (Ala. 1942); Buehman v. Bechtel, 114 
P.2d 227, 232 (Ariz. 1941); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of No. Little Rock, 184 
S.W.2d 52, 54 (Ark. 1944); Abdoo v. City and County of Denver, 397 P.2d 222, 223 (Colo. 
1964); Hart v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 780, 782 (Conn. 1942); Sullivan v. 
DeCerb, 23 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. 1945); Berry v. Summers, 283 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Idaho 
1955); Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580, (Ill. 1995); City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 
N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 1942); Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 453 P.2d 82, 
87 (Kan. 1969); City of Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 155 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Ky. 
1941); City of Shreveport v. Restivo, 491 So.2d 377, 380 (La. 1986); Opinion of the 
Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948); Moore v. Grillis, 39 So.2d 505, 509, 512 (Miss. 
1949); State v. Gleason, 277 P.2d 530,533-34 (Mont. 1954); Jewel Tea Co. v. City of 
Geneva, 291 N.W. 664, 670 (Neb. 1940); State v. Moore, 13 A.2d 143, 148 (N.H. 1940); 
N.J. Good Humor, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Borough of Bradley Beach, 11 A.2d 113, 118 
(N.J. 1940); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 49 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1943); 
Roller v. Allen, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (N.C. 1957); State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 922 
(N.D. 1943); Frecker v. Dayton, 90 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ohio 1950); Whittle v. State Bd. of 
Exam’rs of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329-30 (Okla. 1971); Hertz Corp. v. Heltzel, 341 
P.2d 1063, 1069 (Or. 1959); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Sharon, 92 A.2d 222, 224 (Pa. 1952); City 
of Rapid City v. Schmitt, 71 N.W.2d 297, 298 (S.D. 1955); Livesay v. Tenn. Bd. of 
Exam’rs in Watchmaking, 322 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Tenn. 1959); Vermont Salvage Corp. v. 
St. Johnsbury, 34 A.2d 188, 197 (Vt. 1943); Moore v. Sutton, 39 S.E.2d 348, 351-52 (Va. 
1946); Thorne v. Roush, 261 S.E.2d 72, 75 (W.Va. 1979).
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Lochner era had not drawn to a close, but other examples present 
themselves up through the present day.129
e. Sunday Closing Laws
Whereas the invalidation of many advertising restrictions by state 
courts under economic substantive due process review presaged the United 
States Supreme Court invalidating many such restrictions under the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause,130 the invalidation of Sunday closing 
laws by many state courts has occurred in spite of the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to strike down such laws as per se violations of the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.131  The Supreme Court has held that a 
legislature may mandate a uniform day of rest as long as it is for a secular 
purpose and does not substantially burden one’s religion.132  Ten state 
supreme courts, however, often caring not a whit whether the law possesses 
a religious purpose, have struck down Sunday closing laws as unreasonable 
and anticompetitive.133  This is an area of economic substantive due process 
that has weathered the passage of time much better than others, as several 
cases were decided in recent decades.134
III. WHICH STATES HAVE ENFORCED ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND WHEN
As stated above,135 and set forth in detail in the Appendixes, the 
persistence of economic substantive due process review under state 
constitutional law in state supreme courts during the 1940s, 1950s, and 
129 See, e.g., Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580, (Ill. 1995) (determining private alarm 
contractor licensing scheme unconstitutional as invalid use of the police power); Nixon v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 839 A.2d 277, 290 (Pa. 2003) (concluding that law restricting 
recently released criminals from working in nursing homes “unconstitutionally infringes on 
the Employees’ right to pursue an occupation”).
130 See supra Part II.B.2.b.
131 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (plurality opinion).  
132
 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963)
133 See Handy Dan Imp. Center, Inc. v. Adams, 633 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Ark. 1982); Fair 
Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu P’ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101, 107-08 (Conn. 1994); Rogers v. 
State, 199 A.2d 895, 897 (Del. 1964); Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543, 551 (Fla. 
1961); West v. Town of Winnsboro, 211 So.2d 665, 672, (La. 1967); Terry Carpenter, Inc. 
v. Wood, 129 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Neb. 1964); State v. Smith, 143 S.E.2d 293, 299 (N.C. 
1965); Spartan’s Indus., Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 498 P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. 1972); Dodge 
Town v. Romney, 480 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 1971); Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431, 
437 (Wyo.1964).
134 See cases listed in supra note 133.
135 See supra Part II.B.1.
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1960s is quite astonishing considering such review was all but nominally 
abandoned by the United States Supreme Court.  As Appendix B illustrates, 
in the 1940s state courts of highest review invalidated economic regulations 
sixty-eight times under economic substantive due process.136  In the 1950s 
this number grew to ninety -six instances.  This was in the face of the 
continued, and relentless, insistence of the United States Supreme Court 
that it was no longer in the business of economic substantive due process.  
In the 1960s the numbers fell, but only back to the level of the 1940s, with 
sixty-seven such instances according to the research underlying this 
study.137  What is more, the court of highest review of every state except 
Alaska, Hawai’i, and Rhode Island utilized economic substantive due 
process to protect economic liberties during the period from 1940-1969.  
Even these three omissions are misleading because Alaska and Hawai’i 
only gained statehood in 1959, and 1960, respectively,138 and Rhode Island, 
although it has refused to interpret its due process clause to provide 
substantive protections,139 invalidated a state statute, on at least one 
occasion, through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.140
Although no study before this one has attempted a comprehensive 
review of all economic substantive due process cases during the 1940s, 
1950s, and 1960s,141 prior studies have provided extensive analysis of this 
period and of why the state courts hung onto economic substantive due 
process for such a time.142  The excellence of those studies notwithstanding, 
no study that has come to the Author’s attention has analyzed in any detail 
the decades after 1970 as a distinct time period.  More specifically, no study 
has revealed the immense drop in state supreme courts actively using 
economic substantive due process review after 1970.
And drop the numbers did.  Whether the history of the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1960s be labeled “judicial activism” or “protecting the rights of the 
individual,” it was not to last.  During the 1970s state supreme courts 
applied economic substantive due process in protecting economic liberties 
on forty-eight occasions.143  Admittedly, this is not a drastic departure from 
136
 For what is meant by “economic substantive due process” please see supra Part II.  
137 See infra Appendix B.
138 Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. 85-508 (1959); Hawaii Admission Act 86-3 (1959).
139 See supra note 41.
140
 Haigh v. State Board of Hairdressing, 72 A.2d 674, 677-79 (R. I. 1952).
141
 One study alluded to research made of how many times a state court of highest review 
struck down economic regulations through economic substantive due process, but the 
article did not include the specific cases from each state, and included a different time-
period from that analyzed here.  See Gary M. Anderson et al., On the Incentives of Judges 
to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers, 32 J.L. & ECON. 215 (1989).
142 See supra note 15.
143 See infra Appendix B.
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past practices, but was a significant drop from the sixty-seven of the 1960s.  
The bottom really fell out of the market in the 1980s, with a mere eleven 
instances.144  In the 1990s the numbers fell even further, to eight.  So far 
during the 2000s, this research has uncovered a paltry three occasions 
where state supreme courts have protected economic liberties through 
applying economic substantive due process.145  In addition, unsurprisingly, 
fewer and fewer states have continued the past application of the doctrine.  
Since 1980 only thirteen state supreme courts have added to this study’s 
case law.146
This Article now turns to a state-by-state assessment of trends in 
economic substantive due process, and similar doctrines, since 1940.  It 
begins with those states that were active in their protection of economic 
liberties through economic substantive due process in the decades following 
the New Deal, and have continued to be at least somewhat active since 
1980.  For the sake of convenience and brevity, this Section does not 
analyze each and every state that has done so, but only highlights the three 
particularly interesting examples of Florida, Illinois, and Georgia.  This 
Article then turns to states that were active in the years immediately 
following the Lochner era but who have since refused to apply the doctrine.  
A. States That Were Active in Applying Economic Substantive 
Due Process After 1940, and Have Continued to Since 1980
1. Florida!  Florida!  Florida!147
Heads-and-shoulders above the rest, the Florida Supreme Court has 
continuously protected economic liberty through the application of 
economic substantive due process.  Since 1940 it has done so twenty-nine 
times.148  The nearest to this is Illinois, at sixteen.149  Most of the court’s 
144 See infra Appendix B.
145
 Please remember that this does not include the use of economic substantive due process 
in land use zoning cases.  See supra, Part II.B.2.
146
 These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.  See infra, 
Appendix B.
147
 “Florida, Florida, Florida.  I honestly believe Matt, as goes Florida, will go the nation.”  
Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 6, 2000) (Tim Russert to Matt Lauer on the 
eve of the 2000 presidential election).
148 See infra Appendix B.
149 See infra Appendix B.  This number does not include a large number of Illinois land use 
zoning cases that are excluded for reasons stated in Part I.B, supra.  See, e.g., City of Loves 
Park v. Woodward Governor Co., 153 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ill. 1958) (concluding that zoning 
of lot for residential purposes, adjacent to automobile plant, beyond legitimate use of the 
police power); Mack v. County of Cook, 142 N.E.2d 785, 789 (Ill. 1957) (holding that 
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economic substantive due process holdings were in the 1950s and 1960s, 
but even the 1980s saw three instances, the most of any state supreme court 
in the nation.150  The most recent, Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Butler, 
was a classic economic substantive due process opinion, where the court 
invalidated a statute limiting the rebates that insurance agents may 
receive.151  The court’s history includes many of the “usual suspects” 
discussed earlier in this Article,152 including price controls,153 advertising 
restrictions,154 Sunday closing laws,155 different incarnations of the state’s 
Fair Trade Act,156 and occupational licensing laws.157  Furthermore, the 
court has innovated to some extent, including two race track related tax 
cases,158 and striking down a ban on the possession of embossing 
machines.159
The reasons for the Florida Supreme Court’s extraordinary use of 
economic substantive due process, including the motivations behind the 
classification of property as non-commercial was not a proper use of the police power); 
Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 115 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 1953) (zoning of land in 
mostly industrial area as “residential” is “manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary and 
capricious”).  
150 See infra Appendix B.
151 770 So.2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. 2000).
152 See supra, Part I.B.2.
153 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So.2d 560, 563-64 (Fla. 1976) (concluding that 
energy price restrictions are unconstitutional because, inter alia, they exceed the state’s 
police power).
154 See, e.g. Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So.2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1963) (invalidating 
ordinance banning outdoor advertising of lodging accommodations); Miami Springs v. 
Scoville, 81 So.2d 188, 192-93 (Fla. 1955) (determining that ordinance regulating the size 
of gas station signs exceeds the police power).
155 Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543, 551 (Fla. 1961) (determining that Sunday closing 
law for automobile dealers exceeds police power).
156
 Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954) (invaliding nonsigner clause 
of state Fair Trade Act); Liquor Store v. Cont’l Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 385 (Fla. 
1949) (invalidating Fair Trade Act as “arbitrary and unreasonable”).
157 See, e.g., Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439, 442 ( Fla. 1963) (concluding 
education requirement for masseurs an invalid use of the police power); Sullivan v. 
DeCerb, 23 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. 1945) (holding that photography licensing scheme beyond 
the proper exercise of the police power).
158
 Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 397 So.2d 
692, 695 (Fla. 1981) (holding that permit scheme deducting one percent of race winnings 
and transferring funds to private associations is an invalid exercise of the state police 
power); Hilaleah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 245 So. 2d 625, 628-
29 (Fla. 1971) (striking down as violating substantive due process statute regulating race 
track operating days according to the amount of tax revenue the track produced in the 
preceding year).
159 State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1129 (Fla.1986) (striking down statute criminalizing the
possession of embossing machines on substantive due process grounds).
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state’s individual justices, local history outside of the court’s case law, or 
unusual machinations in the state’s legislature160 are beyond the scope of 
this study.  Although this Article briefly explores what has led to the recent 
nation-wide decline in the use of economic substantive due process under 
state constitutional law,161 speculations on individual states, even in the case 
of mighty Florida, rely on too few data points to be of much value.  What 
may briefly be said is that the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted a “due 
process clause” nearly identical to that of the United States Supreme Court 
in striking down economic regulations.162  In short, the Florida opinions 
listed in Appendix A by-and-large textually rest on nothing more than a 
“generic” due process clause and the extra-textual bases of exceeding the 
police power or lacking a rational basis.  Nevertheless, with as much a 
textual commitment to economic liberty as the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the Florida Constitution to protect 
economic liberty through economic substantive due process more than any 
other state court of highest review since 1940.  Perhaps the lesson to be 
taken from this is that it is not the text of the constitution that matters in 
whether a court protects an economic liberty.  Instead, the reasons may be 
non-textual, or even non-legal, considerations.
2. Illinois
A very distant second to Florida, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
struck down economic regulations under economic substantive due process 
on sixteen occasions.  This has run the gamut of different areas of economic 
160
 All of these reasons are purely hypothetical and could be applied to any state 
government.  They are the type of reasons, however, that may account for a state’s stepped-
up enforcement of economic substantive due process.  For a discussion of how the use of 
economic substantive due process at the state level may be superior to that under the 
United States Constitution, precisely because of local variations in state economies, see 
Hetherington, supra note 15, at 250 (stating that local differences in economic realities may 
countenance different results under economic substantive due process review in different 
states).
161 See infra Part IV.
162 Compare Fl. Const. Art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law . . . .”); with U.S. Const. amend. 14 § 1 (“nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”).  The 
Florida Constitution does include language that directly protects economic liberties, but the 
state supreme court has not been active in relying upon it.  See Fla. Const. art. I § 2 (“All 
natural persons . . . have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend 
life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess 
and protect property . . . .”).
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regulation, from keeping auto records,163 to mandating that employers pay 
their employees while they leave to vote.164  Occupational licensing has 
taken many a hit from the court, with it striking-down four plumbing 
licensing schemes alone.165  Other anti-licensing opinions include the 
invalidation of the requirement that a funeral director obtain an embalmer’s 
license,166 and a case from as recently as 1995 invalidating a scheme 
licensing private alarm contractors.167
Illinois stands an interesting exception when viewing its supreme 
court’s performance against the nation-wide trend of economic substantive 
due process cases.  With the exception of the roaring 1950s,168 when the 
Illinois Supreme Court utilized the doctrine in non-land use zoning cases 
seven times, in no decade since 1940 has the court issued more than three 
opinions striking down an economic regulation on substantive due process 
grounds.169  Yet, the court has issued at least one such opinion in every 
decade, including the 2000s, except for the 1980s.  This long, but measured, 
tail stretching out from the days of the Lochner court illustrates how a court 
can create a tempered, yet alive, jurisprudence of economic liberty.170
163 People v. Wright, 740 N.E.2d 755, 768-69 (Ill. 2000) (invalidating statute penalizing 
auto recycling owner for not keeping accurate records even when lacking criminal intent).
164 Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 128 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ill. 1955) (determining 
a “pay-while-voting” statute “has no real or substantial relation to the object of public 
welfare” and therefore is an unconstitutional use of the police power).  The Kentucky Court 
of Appeals struck down a similar statute.  Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 204 
S.W.2d 973, 975 (Ky. 1947). 
165
 People v. Johnson, 369 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ill. 1977) (holding that plumbing licensing 
scheme, as implemented, created an unconstitutional monopoly power in the hands of 
already licensed plumbers); People v. Masters, 274 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. 1971) (striking down 
plumbing licensing law); Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E.2d 169, 170-73 (Ill. 1953) (striking 
down pluming licensing law as not a proper exercise of the police power); People v. 
Brown, 95 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 1950) (striking down various arduous plumbing licensing 
restrictions as violating substantive due process).
166
 Gholson v. Engle, 138 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ill. 1956) (striking down regulation on 
substantive due process grounds, and concluding “[t]he record does not, in our opinion, 
establish that public health considerations justify the requirement that a funeral director be 
a licensed embalmer”).
167
 Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580, (Ill. 1995) (determining private alarm contractor 
licensing scheme unconstitutional as invalid use of the police power).
168 See infra Appendix B.
169 See infra Appendix B.  See Part I.B for why land use zoning cases are excluded from 
consideration.
170
 For an argument that the United States Supreme Court should apply a level of rational-
basis scrutiny to economic regulations, yet a stricter level of rational-basis than that 
currently applied, see the comments of President Clinton’s former Acting Solicitor General 
Walter Dellinger.  See Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights & Personal 
Liberty, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 14-16 (2004).
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3. Georgia
This Section closes with a relatively recent opinion from the 
Georgia Supreme Court.  It is one of the most recent examples of a state 
supreme court explicitly rejecting the federal courts’ non-use of economic 
substantive due process.171  In 1987, while striking down a ban on sales 
below cost, the court had the following to say about its constitutional 
jurisprudence:
This court has repeatedly declared “that ‘[t]he right to contract, and 
for the seller and purchaser to agree upon a price, is a property right 
protected by the due-process clause of our Constitution, and unless it 
is a business “affected with a public interest,” the General Assembly 
is without authority to abridge that right,’” no matter what other 
states or the Supreme Court of the United States “may or may not 
have decided.”172
The Georgia Supreme Court’s insistence on continuing to apply the 
“affected with a public interest” test is a throw-back to the pre-Nebbia
period of the Lochner era.173  In Strickland the court affirmed its earlier 
determination174 that the petroleum industry is not affected with a public 
interest.175  Because it was not, the legislature therefore lacked the power to 
regulate its prices.176
The court’s statement that the Georgia General Assembly has no 
authority to abridge the right to contract “no matter what other states or the 
Supreme Court of the United States” may at first sound like a bit of 
libertarian bravado, but is actually little different from statements state 
courts routinely make regarding the United States Supreme Court in matters 
of criminal law and privacy.177  The statement’s spirit is consonant with 
Justice Brennan’s battle cry to the states discussed in the Introduction.178
171
 For an older example from a different state, see the discussion of the Indiana Supreme 
Court, infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text.
172 Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc., 353 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. 1987) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).
173 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
174
 The court had earlier done so in Batton-Jackson Oil Co., Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16, 
18-19 (Ga. 1986) (“As it cannot be said that the gasoline industry is devoted to the citizens 
of this state and its use granted to the public, we conclude that the gasoline industry is not 
affected with a public interest . . . .”).
175 See Strickland, 353 S.E.2d at 18.
176 See id.
177 See supra note 2.
178 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” BEFORE ITS 
TIME
31
31
The court’s refusal to accept the conventional wisdom on the right to 
contract illustrates that in the State of Georgia, at least as of 1987, the “New 
Judicial Federalism” is alive and well in its attempt to preserve the legacy of 
the Lochner era.179
B. States That Were Active After 1940, but Have not Utilized Economic 
Substantive Due Process Since 1980
As with the previous section, the following does not review ever 
state supreme court that fits this category, but investigates a few examples 
illustrating how a state judiciary may actively enforce the principles of 
economic substantive due process review for a time, before letting the 
doctrine die away.  The states considered are Indiana, Massachusetts, and 
South Carolina.
1. Indiana
After four holdings enforcing economic substantive due process in 
the 1940s, in 1952 the Indiana Supreme Court drew the following line in the 
sand between itself and the contemporary trend of constitutional law: “This 
court has in the past consistently refused to follow the ‘pattern’ or ‘drift’ 
apparent in the decisions of other courts which approve mere legislative 
price fixing.”180  The court struck down a price restriction on automobile 
dealers because they were not reasonably related to the legislative 
purpose.181  In doing so it proudly cited a Lochner-era case, Liggett Co. v. 
Baldridge,182 which struck down licensing restrictions on pharmacists.183  In 
contrast, the United States Supreme Court subsequently overruled Liggett, 
labeling it “a derelict in the stream of the law.”184
179
 The Georgia Supreme Court has a long history of pining for the Lochner era.  In 1951 
the court complained at length regarding the plight of economic liberties in the face of 
cases such as Nebbia v. New York.  Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 696 (Ga. 1951).  
Arguing that, in the face of a world-wide war against communism, it would not be right to 
turn over to the legislature all decisions regarding economic regulation, and that “[b]y such 
conduct the legislature, aided and abetted by the judiciary, could ultimately convert 
Georgia into a socialist state despite the plain provisions of the Constitution which forbid 
such.”  Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1951).  Regarding such an attitude, one 
commentator mildly noted, “The Georgia Supreme Court . . . found the self restraint 
philosophy distasteful.”  Note, supra note 15, at 317.
180 Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 635 (Ind. 1952).
181 See id.
182
 278 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1928).
183 See Holt, 108 N.E.2d at 635 (citing Ligett). 
184
 N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973).
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Four years later the Indiana Supreme Court utilized the doctrine 
again, striking down a restriction on automobile dealers.185  After that, 
however, it left the field.  Since 1956 the court has refused to invalidate an 
economic regulation on economic substantive due process grounds.186  Such 
a “switch in time” is not, of course, unusual,187 but it is quite a contrast to 
the practice of other states that continued to fight the “drift” in 
constitutional law for decades more.188
2. Massachusetts
The now “liberal” Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts189
extended its respect for liberty into the economic sphere in the 1940s, 
1950s, 1960s, and even 1970s.190  This included two cases striking down 
compulsory auto insurance mandates,191 as well as occupational licensing 
185 Dep’t of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 138 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ind. 1956) (striking down bar 
on automobile dealers also selling auto insurance on grounds that there was no “good 
cause” for the law).
186 See infra Appendix B.  The court has, however, invalidated land use zoning restrictions 
on economic substantive due process since Motor Insurance Corp.  See Metro. Bd. of 
Zoning Appeals of Marion County v. Gateway Corp., 268 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ind. 1971): Bd. 
of Zoning Appeals of City of New Albany v. Koehler, 194 N.E.2d 49, 55 (Ind. 1963).
187
 This, of course, refers to the switch in voting practices by Chief Justice Hughes between 
1936 and 1937.  See Micael Comiskey, Can a President Pack—Or Draft—The Supreme 
Court?  FDR and the Court in the Great Depression and World War II, 57 ALB. L. REV.
1043, 1046 (1994).
188 See supra III.B.  The Oregon Supreme Court made a similar defiant comment to that in 
Holt in 1952: 
In by-gone days when government was deemed to be a responsibility of the 
people, rather than the people being a responsibility of government, as is 
unfortunately too much the case today, all legislation of the character now under 
consideration was deemed an unreasonable interference with the right of the 
individual to contract and to own and enjoy private property.  Laws attempting to 
fix minimum wages or prices were uniformly held invalid as being in violation of 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Christian v. La Forge, 242 P.2d 797, 805 (Or. 1952).  This sentiment had little long term 
effect.  The court has not enforced economic substantive due process, broadly understood, 
since the 1960s.  See infra Appendix B.  “Broadly understood” is worth emphasizing 
because the Oregon Constitution lacks either a “due process clause” or a “law of the land” 
clause.  See Or. Const. passim.
189 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-970 (2003) (declaring 
that denying same-sex marriage violates equal protection under the state’s constitution).
190 See infra Appendix B.  
191 Traveler’s Indem. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 265 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Mass. 1970) (holding that 
maximum rates set for compulsory auto insurance were unconstitutionally low as they were 
confiscatory); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698, 703 (Mass. 
1970) (similar holding).
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rulings.192  The original opening to the state’s constitution reflected a deep 
commitment to economic liberty, proclaiming, “All men are born free and 
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among 
which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and 
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that 
of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”193  This commitment 
contributed to the court’s opinion in Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Public Health in 1965.194
In Coffee-Rich the court reasoned that the consumer-protection 
regulation at issue was unconstitutional because it demeaned the 
intelligence of the consumer.  The case concerned a law prohibiting the sale 
of a dairy substitute product.195  Assessing the argument that the bar was 
necessary to prevent fraud, the court bluntly, and repeatedly, stated that 
members of the public must be given some credit in determining for 
themselves what a product actually is: 
We think that average consumers are aware that milk and cream are 
not ‘vegetable product[s].’ Similarly, advertising matter displayed 
on the frozen food counters from which Coffee-Rich is purveyed 
clearly and conspicuously states that Coffee-Rich is a ‘frozen non-
dairy’ product. Again, we think that average consumers are aware 
that milk and cream are dairy products. . . . We do not believe that 
an average consumer would buy this product under the mistaken 
impression that it is milk or cream.196
192 In re Opinion of the Justices, 151 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Mass. 1958) (stating that a proposed 
regulation on the hours barbers may keep would violate economic liberties); Mansfield 
Beauty Acad’y, Inc. v. Bd. of Registration of Hairdressers, 96 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Mass. 
1951) (striking down bar on beauty schools accepting payment for hairdressing students 
rendering services); Opinion of the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948) (stating that 
proposed bill barring cemetery owners and operators from selling cemetery monuments 
would be an invalid exercise of the police power).
193
 Mass. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 1 (annulled, but quoted language readopted in Article CVI).
194
 204 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Mass. 1965).
195 See Coffee-Rich, 204 N.E.2d at 283.  Other cases have found state supreme courts 
striking down restrictions on the sale of alternative dairy products.  See People ex rel. 
Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 490 P.2d 940, 945 ( Colo. 1971) (ruling Filled Dairy 
Products Act, outlawing vegetable substitute for sour crème, to violate substantive due 
process); Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Trenhaile, 486 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Idaho 1971) 
(striking down statute banning “filled milk” under substantive due process); Brackman v. 
Kruse, 199 P.2d 971, 978 (Mont. 1948) (declaring prohibitive oleomargarine licensing fees 
unconstitutional as “excessive, confiscatory and prohibitive”); Flynn v. Horst, 51 A.2d 54, 
60 (Pa. 1947) (determining act licensing the sale of oleomargarine violated substantive due 
process).
196 Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 288-89 (Mass. 
1965).  The court also noted, “It seems to us that the defendants’ reasons for attempting to 
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Because the public could be assumed to read the labels of Coffee-Rich 
products, the court concluded that the consumer-protection justification for 
the law was illusory.  Such an inquiry, however, was not to stay in the 
state’s jurisprudence for long.  Eight years later the court stated that it 
employed the equivalent of the federal rational-basis test in reviewing 
economic regulation, asserting that “any rational basis of fact that 
reasonably can be conceived” will prevent a challenge to economic 
regulation.197  Since then the court has not employed economic substantive 
due process to strike down a restriction on economic liberty.198
3. South Carolina
South Carolina is an example of a state that used economic 
substantive due process to protect economic liberty in the decades after the 
close of the Lochner era, did not enforce the doctrine for many years, and 
then whole-heartedly repudiated its use.  In the 1960s the state’s supreme 
court repeatedly struck-down the regulation of milk prices.199 In the 
Gwynette case the court examined the various opinions in Nebbia and 
explicitly adopted the reasoning from Justice McReynolds’ dissent.200
McReynolds had stated that “fixation of the price at which A, engaged in an 
ordinary business, may sell, in order to enable B, a producer, to improve his 
condition, has not been regarded as within legislative power.”201  He 
reasoned that if the courts deferred to the legislature in its determination of 
when a price regulation was necessary for the public interest, then the 
prohibit the sale of Coffee-Rich are more fanciful than real.”  Id. at 288 (citing Opinion of 
the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948)).  
197
 Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 358 (Mass. 1973); see also
Howard, supra note 15, at 882-83 (stating that Massachusetts’ highest court, and those of 
some other states, “defer to legislative judgments in terms similar to those used by the 
United States Supreme Court”).
198 See infra Appendix B.  But see Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley, 813 N.E.2d 843, 845 
(Mass. 2004) (zoning case).
199 See Richbourg’s Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1967) (holding 
milk price-control law to be unconstitutional); Stone v. Salley, 137 S.E.2d 788, 793 (S.C. 
1964) (holding milk price-control law to violate substantive due process); Gwynette v. 
Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 680 (S.C. 1960) (declaring that a milk price-control law is an 
illegitimate exercise of the police power).
200 Gwynette, 115 S.E.2d at 679 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting)).  About Nebbia the Gwynette court stated, “The majority 
opinion in that case, however conclusive as to applicable provisions of the Federal 
Constitution, does not control us in the interpretation of the Constitution of this state, under 
which the issue here arises.”  Id.
201 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 554 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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legislature could always evade judicial review of such enactments and that 
“such a view, of course, would put an end to liberty under the 
Constitution.”202  Relying on this, the South Carolina court struck down the 
price control as an illegitimate exercise of the police power.203
Years passed by, and then in 2000 the court overruled all of these 
milk price control cases.  Asserting that only it and the Georgia Supreme 
Court still engaged in the “affected with a public interest” inquiry, it handed 
the legislature much broader powers in its ability to regulate the milk 
industry.204  As seen throughout this Article, such a statement regarding 
South Carolina and Georgia is misleading when taking into account the 
existence of recent cases in other states utilizing economic substantive due 
process.205  Furthermore, although courts might refuse to enforce some of 
them, almost all of the cases listed in Appendix A have not been explicitly 
overruled.206  South Carolina, in that way, stands as an exception.
IV. WHY SUCH A PRECIPITOUS DECLINE? WAS ROE V. WADE THE FLY IN 
THE CONSERVATIVE OINTMENT? 
Although economic substantive due process still functions in the 
state courts, it is nothing like what it was only thirty years ago.207  What 
explains this drop?  What explains it especially after the relatively prolific 
use of the doctrine by state courts in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s?  
Commentators have proposed various ideas why state courts hung onto the 
doctrine in those decades immediately following the close of the Lochner
era, but because this Article is the first to recognize the more recent drop in 
the use of the doctrine, no studies have so far suggested a reason for it.  This 
Part will introduce some possible answers.  One is that state judges who 
were legally trained during the Lochner era had a hard time coming to grips 
202 Id. at 555 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
203 Se Gwynette,, 115 S.E.2d at 679.
204 R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000).
205 See generally infra cases listed in Appendix A.  It may have been true that, strictly 
speaking, only South Carolina and Georgia used the “affected with a public interest” test, 
but, as has been repeatedly mentioned, other states invalidated economic regulations 
through other manifestations of economic substantive due process.
206
 In addition to South Carolina, the West Virginia Supreme Court has overruled some of 
its post-1940 economic substantive due process opinions.  State v. Wender, 141 S.E.2d 
359, 363 (W.Va. 1965) (striking down cigarette minimum price law as violating 
substantive due process), overruled by Hartsock-Flsher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale 
Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144, 150 (W.Va. 1984); State v. Mem’l Gardens Dev. Corp., 101 
S.E.2d 425, (W.Va. 1957) (deciding that regulation of pre-need sales of funeral items 
violates substantive due process), overruled by Whitener v. West Va. Bd. of Embalmers & 
Funeral Dirs., 288 S.E.2d 543, 545 (W.Va. 1982).
207 See infra Appendix B.
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with the revolution of the New Deal, and clung onto the doctrine until they 
began retiring en mass in the 1970s.  Another is that state justices 
experimented for a time with economic substantive due process under a 
“New Judicial Federalism” approach, and then, for whatever reason, 
backed-off out the experiment in the 1970s and 1980s.  A more 
controversial hypothesis, and that advocated here, is that abhorrence by 
conservatives of the result in Roe v. Wade, and of the case’s substantive due 
process analysis, turned many traditional advocates of economic substantive 
due process into critics of substantive due process review generally.  In the 
process, economic substantive due process under state constitutional law 
was not eviscerated, but injured severely.
A. The Old Judges Die Hard, and Judicial Experimentation, 
Hypotheses
In 1976 Professor A.E. Dick Howard, a leading authority on state 
constitutional law, had this to say concerning the continued use of economic 
substantive due process in state courts:
Old habits die hard, and it is not surprising that state court 
judges in the 1950’s were still thinking in substantive due process 
terms.  That generation of judges had completed their legal 
education well before even the Supreme Court had begun to reject 
the premises of the cases decided early in the twentieth century.  
Once might expect, however, that by the 1970’s, with the Supreme 
Court’s renunciation of substantive due process in economic cases 
so clear and so widely known, state courts would have fallen in line, 
and limited their own review of legislative judgments touching 
social and economic questions. 
A look at state court decisions since the 1960’s and 1970’s 
shows that this has not happened.208
As this Article has illustrated, it did happen.  Was Professor Howard merely 
wrong about the data and not about the judges?  As more and more law 
students graduated after studying West Coast Hotel instead of Lochner v. 
New York, perhaps the tipping point finally came in the 1970s, and by the 
1980s and 1990s these new judges were firmly in command of the nation’s 
state supreme courts, ready to avoid the ghosts of Lochner that had haunted 
their chambers since the 1930s.
208
 Howard, supra note 15, at 882.
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This proposal could possibly be the correct explanation.  However, 
it does not satisfactorily explain the rise in economic substantive due 
process opinions from the 1940s to the 1950s.  The rise was considerable—
from sixty-eight to ninety-six.  Was this a “last gasp” of the old guard of 
“Lochnarians” striking back against the forces of the New Deal?209
Perhaps.  Yet, at the same time, this explanation sounds a bit too 
conspiratorial for fifty sets of jurists.  Perhaps instead, the judges of the 
1950s collectively tried to experiment with economic substantive due 
process under their own constitutions, and later assessed the experiment a 
failure.210
As has been argued elsewhere—in normative evaluations of state 
economic substantive due process—there are valid reasons for rejecting 
such review at the federal level, but keeping it in state courts.  For one 
thing, state judges are often elected, so if the voters feel that a judge is 
interjecting too many of her own socioeconomic views into her opinions 
they can remove her.211  Furthermore, state constitutions are generally much 
easier to amend than the United States Constitution.212  If the people or the 
legislature disagrees with a state supreme court’s decision to protect 
economic liberty through the state constitution’s due process clause, they 
can amend the constitution to preclude such an interpretation.213   In 
addition, state courts “may better adapt their decisions to local economic 
conditions and needs” because their decisions concern only one state 
economy out of fifty.214  It may be that a regulation that is unreasonable in 
one market is a legitimate exercise of the police power in another.215
Another suggestion is that state legislatures, not to mention town councils, 
are much more susceptible to direct and one-sided special interest lobbying 
209
 See, for example, the discussion of the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Department 
of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ind. 1952), supra notes 180-184 and 
accompanying text.
210
 And often under the Fourteenth Amendment as well.  See supra notes 84-94 and 
accompanying text (discussing the tactic often used by state courts of highest review in 
striking down an economic regulation on both state and federal grounds, thus insulating it 
from review by the United States Supreme Court).
211 See Newberg, supra note 18, at 267 (stating that “in all but three states the judges of the 
highest state courts are subject to various forms of majoritarian review”).
212 See id. at 267 (pointing out that many states allow for amending the constitution through 
a referendum or initiative).
213
 The United States Constitution, in fact, possesses several amendments that sought to 
rectify a past Supreme Court interpretation.  For instance, the Eleventh Amendment was a 
direct response to Chisholm v. Geogria.  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see also Tribe, supra 
note 63, at 64-65 & n.10 (noting “four (or perhaps five)” occasions). 
214
 Hetherington, supra note 15, at 250
215 See id. (comparing hypothetical review of theater anti-scalping laws in Indiana and New 
York, taking into account the different theater markets).
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than is Congress.216  State justices are perhaps better attuned to local 
political forces and motivations, and can use review of new regulations to 
ferret-out local protectionist legislation.  
Therefore, with these and similar justifications on the minds of state 
judges, perhaps the 1950s were a time for experimentation, followed by, for 
whatever reason, a pull-back in the 1960s that only grew in the 1970s and 
beyond. 
B. The Convergence Hypothesis
A different view is that something other than attrition, and 
something specific, caused the heavy drop in cases from the 1960s to the 
1970s, and especially from the 1970s to the 1980s.  The 1970s, in fact, saw 
less of a drop, percentage-wise, from the previous decade (forty-eight 
following sixty-seven), than the 1960s did from its predecessor (sixty-seven 
following ninety-six).  However, the drop from the 1970s to its successor 
was over four-fold (eleven following forty-eight).  Such a huge drop after 
the much more gradual decline of the previous two decades does not square 
all that well with either the aging of old fashioned jurists or the 
abandonment of an experimental “new” state approach to economic 
substantive due process.  It would explain the change of one court, such as 
what happened to the United States Supreme Court in the 1930s, but a 
waive of retirements, or a waive of experiments taking less than ten years 
does not satisfactorily account for such a sudden change when those 
retirements and experiments are spread across fifty different jurisdictions.  
This is not to say that these trends could not have caused the four-fold drop 
in cases, it is just to say that a specific event, or events, peculiar to the time 
better fits the data.
If anything “big” happened to cause the four-fold drop it very likely 
took place in the 1970s.217  What in the field of economic substantive due 
process took place in the 1970s?  Other than what has been mention up until 
now in this Article, not very much.  Leave off the word “economic,” 
however, and something seismic occurred.
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court decided that a woman has 
the constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.218  Presaged by 
216
 This applies in other fields of legislation as well.  See W. David Slawson, The Right to 
Protection From Air Pollution, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 667, 767-78 (1986) (“Special interest 
legislation is of special concern to states because state legislatures are more susceptible to 
pressures from special interests that is Congress.”).
217
 Of course the event, or events, could have taken place in the 1960s or before, but then 
this sounds more like a long-term cause, such as the attrition of judges.
218
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965,219 Roe partly relied upon the substantive 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in 
recognizing a woman’s “right to privacy.”220  Although it draw largely on 
the recent precedent establishing the “right to privacy,” Roe was familiar to 
students of the Lochner court.221  The Court identified an unenumerated 
right and then weighed that right against the state’s interest to act through 
the police power in protecting public health and safety.222  The most 
pertinent difference, of course, was that in this case the right was non-
economic.
As students of recent American politics know, the reaction of many 
conservatives to Roe was vicious, ongoing, and relentless.  Much of this 
reaction pertained to the Court “making up rights” and “finding rights in the 
Constitution that are not there.”223  Critics have repeatedly tied Roe to cases 
of the Lochner era.  Comparisons with Lochner were inevitable because 
each case did essentially the same thing—protect unenumerated and (at 
least arguably) Lockean rights through a substantive interpretation of the 
Due Process Clause.224  Conservative jurist Robert Bork has compared both 
219
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).  Griswold did not rely on the 
Due Process Clause, but the opinion of Justice Douglas famously discovered a right to 
privacy in the “penumbras, formed by emanations” of the Bill of Rights.  Id. at 484.
220
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
221
 The underpinnings of the “right to privacy” originated, to some degree, in the Lochner
era.  Says Professor David Bernstein: 
Roe was especially difficult to distinguish from Lochner because its foundation is 
a series of Warren Court privacy decisions beginning with Griswold v. 
Connecticut.  Griswold, in turn, not only asserted a nontextual right of privacy, 
but also relied on Lochner era civil liberties precedents. Like Lochner itself, the 
Lochner era precedents relied upon in Griswold had invalidated state laws based 
on an expansive, substantive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause.
David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003).
222 For instance, the opinion stated, “The Court’s decisions recognizing a right of privacy 
also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate.  
As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in 
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 153-54 (1973).  
223 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, A Conservative View of the Court: Getting Beyond 
“Activism” and “Restraint”, NAT’L REV. (June 16, 2003) (arguing that “Brennan-era 
precedents” involved “the assertion of invented constitutional rights”).
224 See supra note 221.  A strong case can be made that Lochner was founded on a 
traditional understanding of the “substantive” component of due process, while Roe was a 
more flimsy attempt at finding a “right to privacy” in the Due Process Clause and other 
provisions of the Constitution.  What is important for the current thesis, however, is that 
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of these cases to the infamous Dred Scott decision.225  Although he admits 
that, in terms of economic policy, he is predisposed to agree with the result
in a case protecting economic liberties,226 he adamantly contends that it is 
not the judiciary’s place to protect “rights,” such as the right to contract, 
that are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution.  
After contending that Dred Scott was “perhaps the first application 
of substantive due process in the Supreme Court,”227 Bork states, “Lochner 
employed substantive due process to strike down a state law limiting the 
hours of work by bakery employees.  Roe used substantive due process to 
create a constitutional right to abortion.  Lochner and Roe have, therefore, a 
very ugly common ancestor.”228  Bork employees the tactic of repeatedly 
referring to “Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe” collectively, as though they 
form an unbroken line of cases.229 Perhaps Bork himself would have 
denounced Lochner era decisions whether or not Roe and its fellow privacy 
cases had come to fruition.  Even so, Bork’s strict constructivism is highly 
attractive to a jurist who admires the free market, yet is adamantly opposed 
to the liberalization of abortion laws through judicial action.  In similar 
abhorrence of judicial power, conservative legal scholar Graglia has 
compared the methods of Roe and Lochner and argued that both are wrong 
because each turns a procedural limitation on government into a substantive 
one: “The due process clause . . . has absolutely nothing to do with, for 
example, the power of New York State to limit the working hours of bakers 
or of Texas to restrict the availability of abortion.”230
These sentiments illustrate a recognition of the similarity between 
Roe and cases invoking economic substantive due process. Once Roe was 
out those who vigorously disagreed with the legalization of abortion had to 
find fault with the case in order to have any hope of overturning it.  The 
easiest way to do so was to discredit substantive due process itself.  This 
would assist in overturning Roe, but would also discredit the use of “due 
process” clauses in protecting economic liberty.231
both protected what might be characterized as Lockean rights through unenumerated 
constitutional protections.
225 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 32 (1990) (citing Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)).
226 See id. at 225 (“I too . . . accept the correctness of laissez-faire, as so defined.”).
227 Id. at 32 (citing D. CURRIER, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 271 (1985)).
228
 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 32 (1990).
229 See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 32, 131, 193, 209 (1990) (invoking Dred 
Scott, Lochner, and Roe together for the same proposition).
230
 Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Theory”: The Attempted Justification for the Supreme 
Court’s Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L REV. 789, 795 (1987).
231
 This is not to say Bork and Graglia changed their views in order to find fault with Roe.  
It is to say that a jurist who valued economic substantive due process, yet was aghast at the 
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The conservative criticism of “the right to privacy” was not the first 
time substantive due process had been denounced as a form of legislating 
from the bench .232  That began at least as long ago as the dawn of the 
Lochner era, with Professor Thayer’s seminal article, The Origin and Scope 
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law in 1893.233  Thayer argued 
for a deferential form of judicial review where a court should uphold a 
statute as constitutional as long as there exists some reasonable 
interpretation that would allow it to do so.234  His thesis was repeated in 
various forums, from Justice Holmes’ dissent in Lochner itself,235 to the 
arguments by progressive-era intellectuals that the individual’s economic 
liberties must make way for the government’s power to alleviate the 
suffering of capitalist society.236  As seen above,237 the United States 
Supreme Court finally made way for this new progressive jurisprudence 
with Nebbia and West Coast Hotel.238
Why did this distaste not reach the state courts?  An easy 
explanation, and a corollary to Professor Howard’s hypothesis regarding 
judicial attrition,239 is that the Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
in the years immediately following West Coast Hotel were progressive 
scholars and politicians nominated by President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.240  Mathematically speaking, it is easy to make a few 
substitutions in a body of nine people, where a mere five will suffice, in 
order to change the body’s views.  However, it is much harder to change the 
minds of the justices of the several state courts of highest review, supreme 
in their interpretation of their own constitutions.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that state justices stuck, to some degree, to the methodology of 
result of Roe, might think about the former differently once faced with the existence of the 
later.
232
 Indeed, it was not by any means the first time that a court had been tarred with the name 
“Lochner.”  See, e.g. Hetherington, supra note 15, at 249 (“Frequently dissents in cases [in 
state courts] holding regulations invalid on substantive due process grounds accuse the 
majority of resurrecting the concepts of Lochner v. New York.”).
233
 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
234 Id.
235
 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
236 See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court & the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Mich. 
L. Rev. 643 (1909); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L. J. 454, 487 (1909) 
237 See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (outlining the fall of economic 
substantive due process under federal constitutional law).
238 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
240
 Ultimately, seven of the sitting justices were Roosevelt picks.  See Comiskey, supra 
187, at 1046.    
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the Lochner era and ignored the vicissitudes of a small body of favorites of 
a Democratic president.
What is surprising, but only from today’s post-Roe perspective, is 
that state justices who embraced “substantive due process” in the face of the 
Supreme Court’s hostility were “conservative.”  One need only look to 
articles of the 1950s on the preservation of economic substantive due 
process in the state courts to understand that the guardians of the doctrine 
were understood to be “conservative.”241  In 1950 Professor Monrad G. 
Paulsen stated that, regarding the Lochner court, “It has been charged that 
the doctrine of substantive due process has been the means whereby 
conservative judges have read classical economic theory into the 
Constitution.”242  In 1957 an article commented on the persistence of 
economic substantive due process under state constitution law by stating 
that “in . . . states where more conservative social and economic theories 
still hold sway, the courts have refused to follow the federal due process 
doctrine and have clung to the older concept of substantive due process.”243
Yet today, “conservative” jurists often assail substantive due 
process, whether of the economic or non-economic flavor, as alien to their 
jurisprudence.  While he sat on the bench of the Alabama Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Roy Moore was unarguably one of the most conservative 
jurists in the county.244  When concurring in a parental-notification case, the 
Chief Justice reflected on the doctrine’s use in Roe, rhetorically asking, 
“Substantive due process?  The very phrase teeters on the edge of textual 
self-contradiction.”245  Chief Justice Moore did not mention Lochner and its 
ilk, but with such a denunciation of “substantive due process” as a whole, 
one would expect a similar rebuke of its economic subset.  Furthermore, 
241
 Of course, just because a judge is labeled as a “conservative” does not mean that she is.  
The term is, however, safe to use in this context, being that the Supreme Court that gave 
President Roosevelt so many problems was repeatedly labeled a “conservative” court.  See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Under the Bridges of Paris: Economic Liberties Should not be Just 
for the Rich, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 31, 41 (2003) (“The Lochner era featured conservative 
Justices who were deeply committed to a laissez-faire economy, protecting business from 
legislative regulation.”).
242
 Paulsen, supra note 15, at 92 (emphasis added) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
243
 Hoskins & David, supra note 15, at 400.  It is very interesting that Hoskins and Katz 
referred to states that were not only more economically conservative, but also more socially
conservative.  Today, to say that socially conservative judges better respect substantive due 
process than their liberal counterparts is to utter an absurdity.
244
 Chief Justice Moore became nationally famous for refusing to remove a replica of the 
Ten Commandments from the Alabama Supreme Court grounds in the face of a court 
order.  See Mauel Roig-Franzia, Alabama Court Ousts “Ten Commandments Judge”, 
WASH. POST., Nov. 16, 2003, at A3.
245 Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So.2d 542, 550 (2001) (Moore, C.J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia, no friend of progressive intellectuals, has proclaimed his 
contempt for substantive due process as expressed in Lochner. In a punitive 
damages case where the question of substantive limitations on damages 
awards arose, he opined, “I do not accept the proposition that [the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] is the secret repository of all 
sorts of . . . unenumerated, substantive rights—however fashionable that 
proposition may have been (even as to economic rights of the sort involved 
here) at the time of the Lochner-era cases . . . .”246
Thus, it appears many conservative jurists have come to the same 
conclusion that their liberal counterparts reached decades before: economic 
substantive due process cannot be trusted.  This convergence, of course, 
occurred for very different reasons on each side of the aisle.  Liberals did 
not like economic substantive due process for the obvious policy outcomes 
while conservatives moved away because its use provided possible 
legitimacy for the parallel method used in Roe v. Wade.  When faced with 
the choice of (1) distinguishing “economic substantive due process” from 
substantive due process and the “right to privacy,” and (2) discrediting the 
use of substantive due process altogether, enough conservative state justices 
appear to have chosen the latter approach so that the number of economic 
substantive due process cases has had nowhere to go but down.
This about-face in “conservative” views on substantive due process 
under state constitutional law was merely part of the broader, and well-
recognized, conservative retreat from the doctrine in the wake of Roe v. 
Wade discussed earlier.247  It is also a gross oversimplification of current 
attitudes to judicial review amongst those often labeled “conservative.”  
Legal scholars and jurists who are politically conservative often fall into 
two separate categories when it comes to judicial review: judicial 
conservatives on one side and a more countermajoritarian school of thought, 
sometimes called “liberal originalist,”248 on the other.  Therefore, 
“conservative” legal scholars may be conservative on abortion, but still 
advocate heightened judicial review when it comes to economic regulation 
and economic substantive due process.249  This is to say nothing of 
246
 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).
247 See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.  
248 See Timothy Sandfur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 489, 490 (2004) (contrasting “conservative originalism” with “liberal originalism,” 
and explaining that liberal originalism incorporates the Declaration of Independence, and 
its underlying political philosophy, into interpreting the Constitution).
249
 Professor Douglas Kmiec is one example.  See Douglas W. Kmiec, 13 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 183, 191-92 (1993) (distinguishing rights derived from natural law from 
“new” rights, such as the right to an abortion).
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libertarian legal scholars, such as Randy Barnett, who would like to see 
heightened judicial review across the board.250
The above disclaimer aside, however, nuances among legal scholars 
are not what is at issue when explaining a long-term trend spread across 
fifty different jurisdictions.  The over-all effect of Roe v. Wade among 
conservative scholars has undeniably increased distaste for “Lochnerism.”
The effect of Roe, if it did cause the drop in economic substantive due 
process cases in the 1970s and 1980s, did not occur immediately.  It is not 
as though all of the forty-eight cases of the 1970s were issued before the 
date of Roe’s publication.251 However, doctrines do not suffer such drops 
overnight when spread across fifty courts with total discretion in the 
interpretation of their own constitutions.  However, the drop, whatever its 
cause, was huge, and the accompanying conservative rejection of 
heightened judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause cannot be discounted as a meme that may have spread across the 
“conservative” state justices of the land.
CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to catalog every economic substantive due
process opinion under state constitutional law since 1940 in state courts of 
highest review.  More importantly, it has analyzed the trends that the 
cataloging reveals.  It has defined “economic substantive due process” 
broadly to include all cases that substantively protect Lockian rights of an 
economic nature, excluding cases decided under equal protection clauses, 
contracts clauses, takings clauses, and cases involving land use zoning.  
This is the first study that has comprehensively gathered these cases, and its 
findings both confirm and discount past articles on the same subject.  As 
previously recognized, state supreme courts protected economic liberties 
through economic substantive due process under state constitutional law 
after the close of the Lochner era.  State supreme courts continued use of 
the doctrine through the 1940s, expanded in the 1950s, and carried on to a 
great degree in the 1960s.  However, what has not been recognized until this 
Article is that the doctrine declined further in the 1970s and nearly 
collapsed in the 1980s.  Although the doctrine is definitely still alive in 
some states, no state supreme court is aggressive in its use, and many states 
have not employed it in protecting economic liberty for decades.
250 See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 35-36 (2003) (praising the Supreme Court for applying a 
“presumption of liberty” analysis in its opinion in Lawrence v. Texas).
251 See infra Appendix A (listing approximately as many cases from 1970-1973 as from 
1974-1979).
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The reason for the rapid decline of the doctrine’s use in the 1970s 
and 1980s is hard to determine without further analysis across the fifty 
relevant jurisdictions.  This Article has suggested a cause of the decline.  
Preliminarily, the suggestion best explains the near collapse of the doctrine 
in the 1980s.  The suggestion is that the emergence of the “right to privacy” 
cases in the 1960s and 1970s, especially the United States Supreme Court’s 
protection of abortion rights in Roe v. Wade, reversed the lingering respect 
of conservative state jurists for substantive due process.  Within a few years 
of the decision’s issuance, as is evident in the drop in the number of cases 
alone, many conservative state justices joined with their liberal counterparts 
in condemning the use of economic substantive due process.  The doctrine, 
although it had robustly persisted for over thirty years since the fall of 
“Lochnerism,” fell into near disuse because there was almost no one left to 
defend it.  
APPENDIX  A
Cases in which state courts of highest review have protected 
economic liberty through applying economic substantive due process, as 
that doctrine is defined in this Article, under state constitutional law since 
1940
Alabama
City of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So.2d 525, 527 
( Ala. 1980).
White v. Associated Indus. of Ala., Inc., 373 So.2d 616, 620 ( Ala. 
1979).
Estell v. City of Birmingham, 286 So.2d 872, 876 ( Ala. 1973).
Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 147 So.2d 797, 799 ( Ala. 
1962).
Ala. Indep’t Serv. Stations Ass’n v. Hunter, 31 So. 2d 571, 574 (Ala. 1947).
Lisenba v. Griffin, 8 So.2d 175, 117 (Ala. 1942).
Ala. Indep’t Serv. Station Ass’n v. McDowell, 6 So.2d 502, 507 (Ala. 
1942).
Alaska
None.
Arizona
Visco v. State ex rel. Pickrell, 388 P.2d 155, 165 (1963).
Killingsworth v. W. Way Motors, Inc., 347 P.2d 1098, 1101 (Ariz. 1959).
State v. A. J. Bayless Mkts., Inc., 342 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Ariz. 1959).
Findley v. Bd of Supervisors of Mohave County, 230 P.2d 526, 531 (Ariz. 
1951).
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Edwards v. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 231 P.2d 450, 453-54 (Ariz. 
1951).
Buehman v. Bechtel, 114 P.2d 227, 232 (Ariz. 1941).
Arkansas
Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 751 
(Ark.1996).
Handy Dan Imp. Center, Inc. v. Adams, 633 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Ark. 1982).
Hand v. H & R Block, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Ark. 1975).
City of Blytheville v. Thompson, 491 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Ark. 1973).
McCastlain v. R. & B. Tobacco Co., 411 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ark. 1967).
Bachman v. State, 359 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Ark. 1962).
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., 275 S.W.2d 455, 
461 (Ark. 1955).
Wilkins v. City of Harrison, 236 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Ark. 1951).
North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 184 S.W.2d 52, 54 
(Ark. 1944).
Noble v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Ark. 1942).
California
Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512, 521 (Cal. 1978).
Walsh v. Kirby, 105, 529 P.2d 33, 42 (Cal. 1974).
State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 254 P.2d 29, 36 (Cal. 
1953).
Colorado
City and County of Denver v. Nielson, 572 P.2d 484, 486 (Colo. 1977).
People ex rel. Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 490 P.2d 940, 945 (Colo. 
1971).
City of Colo. Springs v. Grueskin, 422 P.2d 384, 387-88 (Colo. 1966).
Abdoo v. City and County of Denver, 397 P.2d 222, 223 (Colo. 1964).
Cleere v. Bullock, 361 P.2d 616, 621 (Colo. 1961).
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d 139, 152 (Colo. 1956).
Battaglia v. Moore, 261 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Colo. 1953).
City and County of Denver v. Thrailkill, 244 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Colo. 1952).
Connecticut
Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu P’ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101, 107-08 
(Conn. 1994). 
Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 417 A.2d 343, 354 (Conn. 1979).
Mott’s Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli, 172 A.2d 381, 386 (Conn. 1961).
United Interchange, Inc. v. Spellacy, 136 A.2d 801, 806 (Conn. 1957).
Amsel v. Brooks, 106 A.2d 152, 158 (Conn. 1954).
Gibson v. Board of Exam’rs of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 783, 784 (Conn. 1942).
Hart v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 780, 782 (Conn. 1942).
State v. Miller, 12 A.2d 192, ___ (Conn. 1940).
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Delaware
Green v. Mid-Penn Nat. Mortg. Co., 268 A.2d 876, 877 (Del. 1970).
Rogers v. State, 199 A.2d 895, 897 (Del. 1964).
State v. Hobson, 83 A.2d 846, 858-59 (Del. 1951).
Florida
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Butler, 770 So.2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. 2000).
In re Forfeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo, 592 So.2d 233, 236 (Fla. 1992).
Dep’t of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate’s Office, 492 So.2d 
1032, 1035 (Fla. 1986).
State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1129 (Fla. 1986).
Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel 
Wagering, 397 So.2d 692, 695 (Fla. 1981).
Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So.2d 479, 484-85 (Fla. 1979).
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So.2d 560, 563-64 (Fla. 1976).
Castlewood Intern. Corp. v. Wynne, 294 So.2d 321, 324 (Fla. 1974).
Hilaleah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 245 So. 2d 
625, 628-29 (Fla. 1971).
Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So. 2d 681, 681-82 (Fla. 
1969).
Rabin v. Conner, 174 So.2d 721, 726 (Fla. 1965).
Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So.2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1963).
Delmonico v. State, 155 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1963).
Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439, 442 (Fla. 1963).
Stadnik v. Shell’s City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 1962).
Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543, 551 (Fla. 1961).
State v. Leone, 118 So.2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1960).
Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188, 192 (Fla. 1958).
State ex rel. Walters v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d 19, 20-21 (Fla. 1958).
Fla. Accountants Ass’n v. Dandelake, 98 So.2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1957).
Miami Springs v. Scoville, 81 So.2d 188, 192-93 (Fla. 1955).
Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954).
Lee v. Shobe, 66 So.2d 256, 256 (Fla. 1953).
Lee v. Delmar, 66 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 1953).
Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Schlapik, 57 So.2d 855, 857 (Fla. 1952).
City of Miami v. Shell’s Super Store, 50 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1951).
Liquor Store v. Cont’l Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 385 (Fla. 1949).
Sullivan v. DeCerb, 23 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. 1945).
Scarborough v. Webb’s Cut Rate Drug Co., Inc., 8 So.2d 913, 922 (Fla. 
1942).
Georgia
Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc., 353 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. 1987).
Batton-Jackson Oil Co., Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 (Ga. 1986).
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Strickland v. Rio Stores, Inc., 255 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ga. 1979).
Georgia Franchise Practices Comm’n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 262 S.E.2d 
106, 108 (1979).
Ward v. Big Apple Super Mkts., 158 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Ga. 1967).
Williams v. Hirsch, 87S.E.2d 70 (Ga. 1955).
Cox v. Gen. Elec. Co., 85 S.E.2d 514, 519 (Ga. 1955).
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 75 S.E.2d 161, 165 (Ga. 
1953).
Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 694-95 (Ga. 1951).
Hawai’i
None.
Idaho
Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Trenhaile, 486 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Idaho 
1971).
Winther v. Village of Weippe, 430 P.2d 689, 695 (Idaho 1967).
Berry v. Summers, 283 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Idaho 1955).
O’Connor v. City of Moscow, 202 P.2d 401, 404 (Idaho 1949).
Illinois
People v. Wright, 740 N.E.2d 755, 768-69 (Ill. 2000).
Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580, (Ill. 1995).
People v. Hamm, 595 N.E.2d 540, 547 (Ill. 1992).
People v. Johnson, 369 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ill. 1977).
Cook County v. Priester, 342 N.E.2d 41, 48 (Ill. 1976).
People v. Masters, 274 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. 1971).
Shoot v. Ill. Liquor Control Comm’n, 198 N.E.2d 497, 500 (Ill. 1964).
City Sav. Ass’n v. Int’l Guar. & Ins. Co., 162 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ill. 1959).
Gholson v. Engle, 138 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ill. 1956).
Wolford v. City of Chicago, 138 N.E.2d 502, 503 (Ill. 1956).
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 128 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ill. 1955).
Figura v. Cummins, 122 N.E.2d 162, 166 (Ill. 1954).
Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E.2d 169, 170-73 (Ill. 1953).
People v. Brown, 95 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 1950).
N. Ill. Coal Corp. v. Medill, 72 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ill. 1947).
Metro. Trust Co. v. Jones, 51 N.E.2d 256, 260 (Ill. 1943).
Indiana
Dep’t of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 138 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ind. 1956).
Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ind. 1952).
Kirtley v. State, 84 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind. 1949).
Dep’t of Ins. v. Schoonover, 72 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind. 1947).
State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs v. Cloud, 44 N.E.2d 972, 979 (Ind. 1942).
Needham v. Proffit, 41 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ind. 1942).
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Iowa
Pierce v. Inc. Town of La Porte City, 146 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1966).
Central States Theatre Corp. v. Sar, 66 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Iowa 1954).
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 65 N.W.2d 410, 419 (Iowa 1954).
City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 1942). 
Kansas 
City of Baxter Springs v. Bryant, 598 P.2d 1051, 1061 (Kan. 1979).
Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Prairie Village, 491 P.2d 910, 913 (Kan. 
1971).
Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 453 P.2d 82, 87 (Kan. 
1969).
Sunflower Tip Top Dairies Co. v. City of Russell, 362 P.2d 76, 80 (Kan. 
1961).
Gilbert v. Mathews, 352 P.2d 58, 69 (Kan. 1960).
State ex rel. Anderson v. Fleming Co., 339 P.2d 12, 18 (Kan. 1959).
Kentucky
Remote Services, Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1989).
Kentucky Milk Marketing and Antimonopoly Comm’n v. Kroger Co., 691 
S.W.2d 893, 900-01 (Ky. 1985).
U.S. Mining & Exploration Natural Resources Co. v. City of Beattyville, 
548 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ky. 1977).
Johnson v. City of Paducah, 512 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Ky. 1974).
Adams, Inc. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Bd. of Health, 439 S.W.2d 
586, 592 (Ky. 1969).
Roe v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky. 1966).
Bruner v. City of Danville, 394 S.W.2d 939, 943-44 (Ky. 1965).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Am. Buyers Corp., 316 S.W.2d 354, 361 (Ky. 1958).
Marshall v. City of Louisville, Ky., 244 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Ky. 1951).
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 976, 976, (Ky. 1947).
Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 973, 975 (Ky. 1947).
Kenton & Campbell Burial Ass’n v. Goodpaster, 200 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Ky. 
1946).
City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ky. 
1944).
City of Mount Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 155 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Ky. 
1941).
City of Louisville v. Kuhn, 145 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Ky. 1940).
Louisiana 
City of Shreveport v. Restivo, 491 So.2d 377, 380 (La. 1986).
City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1083 (La. 1978).
City of Crowley Firemen v. City of Crowley, 280 So. 2d 897, 902 (La. 
1973).
ANTHONY B. SANDERS50
50
West v. Town of Winnsboro, 211 So.2d 665, 672, (La. 1967).
City of Lafayette v. Justus, 161 So.2d 747, 749 (La. 1964).
Sears, Roebuck and Company v. City of New Orleans, 117 So.2d 64, 66 
(La. 1960).
City of Lake Charles v. Hasha, 116 So.2d 277, 280-81 (La. 1959).
Schwegmann Bros. v. La. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 43 So.2d 
248, 260 (La. 1949).
Maine
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
United Interchange, Inc. of Mass. v. Harding, 145 A.2d 94, 97 (Me. 1958).
Opinion of the Justices, 132 A.2d 47, 49 (Me. 1957).
State v. Union Oil co., 120 A.2d 708, 713 (Me. 1956).
Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A.2d 289, 291 (Me. 1956).
Maryland
Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 311 A.2d 242, 252 (Md. 1973).
Md. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs v. Kuhn, 312 A.2d 216, 225 (Md. 1973).
Bruce v. Dir., Dep’t of Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 276 A.2d 200, 209 (Md. 
1971).
City of Baltimore v. Charles Center Parking, Inc., 271 A.2d 144, 147-48 
(Md. 1970).
Loughran v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., 12 A.2d 201, 207 (Md. 
1940).
Middleman v. Davis, 12 A.2d 208, 208 (Md. 1940).
Massachusetts
Traveler’s Indem. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 265 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Mass. 1970).
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698, 703 (Mass. 
1970).
Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Mass. 
1965).
In re Opinion of the Justices, 151 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Mass. 1958).
Mansfield Beauty Acad., Inc. v. Bd. of Registration of Hairdressers, 96 
N.E.2d 145, 147 (Mass. 1951).
Opinion of the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948).
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 30 N.E.2d 269, 276 (Mass. 1940).
Michigan
Grocers Dairy Co. v. McIntyre, 138 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Mich. 1966).
Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman’s Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 54 N.W.2d 
268, 269-70 (Mich. 1952).
Levy v. Pontiac, 49 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mich. 1951).
Minnesota
Fairmont Foods Co. v. City of Duluth, 110 N.W.2d 155, 159 (Minn. 1961).
THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” BEFORE ITS 
TIME
51
51
Mississippi
Goodin v. City of Philadelphia, 75 So.2d 279, 280 (Miss. 1954).
Stone v. Reichman-Crosby Co., 43 So.2d 184, 190-91 (Miss. 1949).
King v. City of Louisville, 42 So.2d 813, 816 (Miss. 1949). 
Moore v. Grillis, 39 So.2d 505, 509, 512 (Miss. 1949).
Town of McCool v. Blaine, 11 So.2d 801, 802 (Miss. 1943).
Saucier v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 198 So. 625, 629 (Miss. 1940).
Missouri
Blue Inv. Co. v. City of Raytown, 478 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1972).
State on Inf. of Taylor v. Currency Servs., Inc., 218 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Mo. 
1949).
Heil v. Kauffman, 189 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Mo. 1945).
State v. Taylor, 173 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Mo. 1943).
Montana
Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996).
State ex rel. Schultz-Lindsay Const. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 403 
P.2d 635, 646 (Mont. 1965).
Garden Spot Mkt., Inc. v. Byrne, 378 P.2d 220, 231 (Mont. 1963).
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 359 P.2d 644, 
654 (Mont. 1961).
State v. Canfield, 277 P.2d 534, 534 (Mont. 1954).
State v. Gleason, 277 P.2d 530,533-34 (Mont. 1954).
Brackman v. Kruse, 199 P.2d 971, 978 (Mont. 1948).
Nebraska
Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Neb. Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Neb. 
1974).
United States Brewers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 220 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Neb. 
1974).
Plucknett v. Morrison, 133 N.W.2d 18, 19 (Neb. 1965).
Skag-Way, Inc. v. Douglas, 133 N.W.2d 12, 13 (Neb. 1965).
Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 129 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Neb. 1964).
Skag-Way Dept. Stores, Inc. v. City of Grand Island, 125 N.W.2d 529, 541 
(Neb. 1964).
Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 104 N.W.2d 227, 234-35 (Neb. 1960).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 68 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Neb. 1955).
McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 721-22, 68 
N.W.2d 608, 618 (Neb. 1955).
City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 53 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Neb. 
1952).
Boomer v. Olsen, 10 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Neb. 1943).
Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 3 N.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Neb. 1942).
Golden v. Bartholomew, 299 N.W. 356, 362 (Neb. 1941).
ANTHONY B. SANDERS52
52
Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 291 N.W. 664, 670 (Neb. 1940).
Nevada
In re Martin, 504 P.2d 14, 16 (Nev. 1972).
Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 396 P.2d 683, 693 (Nev. 1964).
State v. Redman Petroleum Corp., 360 P.2d 842, 845, 846 (Nev. 1961).
New Hampshire
State v. Moore, 13 A.2d 143, 148 (N.H. 1940).
New Jersey
State v. Boston Juvenile Shoes, 288 A.2d 7, 11 (N.J. 1972).
John Moyant, Jr. v. Borough of Paramus, 154 A.2d 9, 21 (N.J. 1959).
Gilbert v. Town of Irvington, 120 A.2d 114, 118 (N.J. 1956).
Lane Distribs. v. Tilton, 81 A.2d 786, 796 (N.J. 1951).
Lakewood Express Service v. Bd. of Public Utility Comm’rs, 61 A.2d 730, 
734 (N.J. 1948).
Hart v. Teaneck Township, 50 A.2d 856, 857-58 (N.J. 1947).
N.J. Good Humor, Inc. v. Bd. of Com’rs of Borough of Bradley Beach, 11 
A.2d 113, 118 (N.J. 1940).
New Mexico
Drink, Inc. v. Babcock, 421 P.2d 798, 803 (N.M. 1966).
Skaggs Drug Center v. Gen. Elec. Co., 315 P.2d 967, 974 (N.M 1957).
New York
People v. Bunis, 172 N.E.2d 273, 274 (N.Y. 1961).
Trio Distrib. Corp. v. City of Albany, 143 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (N.Y. 1957).
Defiance Milk Products Co. v. DuMond, 132 N.E.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. 1956).
Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 49 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1943).
North Carolina
Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 360 S.E.2d 783, 786 (N.C. 1987).
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 226 S.E.2d 498, 506 (N.C. 1976)
Bulva Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib., Inc., 206 S.E.2d 141, 151 (N.C. 1974).
In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 193 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 
1973).
State v. Smith, 143 S.E.2d 293, 299 (N.C. 1965).
State v. Byrd, 130 S.E.2d 55, 59 (N.C. 1963).
Little Pep Delmonico Rest., Inc. v. Charlotte, 113 S.E.2d 422, 423 (N.C. 
1960), overruled by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 1982).
State ex rel. Utilities Com. V. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 113 S.E.2d 57, 61 
(N.C. 1960).
State v. Brown, 108 S.E.2d 74, 78 (N.C. 1959), overruled by State v. Jones, 
290 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 1982).
Winston-Salem v. S. Ry. Co., 105 S.E.2d 37, 52 (N.C. 1958).
Roller v. Allen, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (N.C. 1957).
State v. Balance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731, 736 (N.C. 1949).
THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” BEFORE ITS 
TIME
53
53
State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 886 (N.C. 1940).
North Dakota
Fairmont Foods v. Burgum, 81 N.W.2d 639, 647 (N.D. 1957).
State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 922 (N.D. 1943).
Ohio
Hausman v. City of Dayton, 653 N.E.2d 1190, 1196 (Ohio 1995).
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 147 N.E.2d 481, 484 
(Ohio 1958).
Frost Bar v. City of Shaker Heights, 141 N.E. 2d 245, 246 (Ohio 1957).
Bellevue v. Hopps, 132 N.E.2d 204, 205 (Ohio 1956).
Frecker v. Dayton, 90 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ohio 1950).
Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 76 N.E.2d 91, 91 (Ohio 1947).
City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E.2d 412, 416 (Ohio 1943).
Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Ohio 
1941).
Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 1941).
Oklahoma
Spartan’s Indus., Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 498 P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. 1972).
Whittle v. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329-30 
(Okla. 1971).
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297, 303 (Okla. 1961).
Okla.City v. Poor, 298 P.2d 459, 461-62 (Okla. 1956).
State ex rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 248 P.2d 612, 615 (Okla. 1952).
City of Guthrie v. Pike & Long, 206 Okla. 307, 243 P.2d 697, 701 (1952).
Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538, 544 (Okla. 1949).
Oregon
Leathers v. City of Burns, 444 P.2d 1010, 1015, 1018 (Or. 1968).
Hertz Corp. v. Heltzel, 341 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Or. 1959).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (Or. 1956).
Pennsylvania
Nixon v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 839 A.2d 277, 290 (Pa. 2003).
Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 490, 495 (Pa. 1971).
Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169, 182 (Pa. 
1967).
Lutz v. Armour, 151 A.2d 108, 111 (Pa. 1959).
Warren v. Phila., 127 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. 1956).
Com. ex rel. Woodside v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 116 A.2d 833, 840 (Pa. 1955).
Cott Beverage Corp. v. Horst, 110 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1955).
Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 638 (Pa. 1954).
Otto Milk Co. v. Rose, 99 A.2d 467, 472-73 (Pa. 1953).
Olan Mills, Inc. v. Sharon, 92 A.2d 222, 224 (Pa. 1952).
ANTHONY B. SANDERS54
54
Girard Trust Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 73 A.2d 371, 371 (Pa. 1950), aff’g Girard 
Trust Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 71 Pa. D. & C. 533, 537 (Pa. C.P. 1950).
In re Borsch Estate, 67 A.2d 119, 123 (Pa. 1949).
Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 58 A.2d 464, 475 (Pa. 1948).
Wilcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 521, 528 (Pa. 1947).
Flynn v. Horst, 51 A.2d 54, 60 (Pa. 1947).
Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 72 (Pa. 1940).
Rhode Island
None.
South Carolina
Richbourg’s Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1967), 
overruled by R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 
763, 765 (S.C. 2000).
Stone v. Salley, 137 S.E.2d 788, 793 (S.C. 1964), overruled by R.L. Jordan 
Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000).
Gwynette v. Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 680 (S.C. 1960), overruled by R.L. 
Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 
2000).
Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 99 S.E.2d 665, 672 (S.C. 1957).
Painter v. Forest Acres, 97 S.E.2d 71, 73 (S.C. 1957).
State v. Standard Oil Co., 10 S.E.2d 778, 790 (S.C. 1940).
McCoy v. Town of York, 8 S.E.2d 905, 908 (S.C. 1940).
South Dakota
State v. Nuss, 114 N.W.2d 633, 637 (S.D. 1962).
City of Rapid City v. Schmitt, 71 N.W.2d 297, 298 (S.D. 1955).
City of Sioux Falls v. Kadinger, 50 N.W.2d 797, 800 (S.D. 1951).
Tennessee 
Livesay v. Tenn. Bd. of Exam’rs in Watchmaking, 322 S.W.2d 209, 213 
(Tenn. 1959).
Consumer’s Gasoline Stations v. City of Peelaski, 292 S.W.2d 735, 737 
(Tenn. 1956).
State v. White, 288 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tenn. 1956).
Checker Cab Co. v. City of Johnson City, 216 S.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Tenn. 
1948).
Texas
Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland, 431 S.W.2d 511, 521 
(Tex.1968).
Ex Parte Rodgers, 371 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1963).
Marney v. State, 330 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
San Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 297 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1957).
Utah
Leetham v. McGinn, 524 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1974).
THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” BEFORE ITS 
TIME
55
55
Dodge Town v. Romney, 480 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 1971).
Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Utah 1962).
Salt Lake City v. Revene, 124 P.2d 537, 511 (Utah 1942).
Vermont
Vermont Salvage Corp. v. St. Johnsbury, 34 A.2d 188, 197 (Vt. 1943).
Virginia
Alford v. City of Newport News, 260 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. 1979).
Joyner v. Centre Motor Co., 66 S.E.2d 469, 474 (Va. 1951).
Moore v. Sutton, 39 S.E.2d 348, 351-52 (Va. 1946).
Washington
County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 419 P.2d 993, 999 (Wa. 1966).
Lenci v. Seattle, 388 P.2d 926, 935-36 (Wa. 1964).
Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345 P.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Wa. 1959).
West Virginia
Thorne v. Roush, 261 S.E.2d 72, 75 (W.Va. 1979).
State v. Wender, 141 S.E.2d 359, 363 (W.Va. 1965), overruled by 
Hartsock-Flsher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 328 
S.E.2d 144, 150 (W.Va. 1984).
General Elec. Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co., 103 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W.Va. 
1958).
State v. Mem’l Gardens Dev. Corp., 101 S.E.2d 425, (W.Va. 1957), 
overruled by Whitener v. West Va. Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 
288 S.E.2d 543, 545 (W.Va. 1982).
State ex rel. Schroath v. Condry, 83 S.E.2d 470, 477 (W.Va. 1954).
Wisconsin
Peppies Courtesy Cab Co. v. Kenosha, 475 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Wis. 1991).
Chicago & N.W. Ry. V. La Follette, 169 N.W.2d 441, 451 (Wis. 1969).
Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Tomah, 141 N.W.2d 299, 304-05 
(Wis. 1966).
Wyoming
Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431, 437 (Wyo.1964).
Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 420-21 
(Wyo. 1962).
APPENDIX B
State-by-state, decade-by-decade summary of cases enumerated in 
Appendix A.
State 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s TOTAL
Alabama 3 0 1 2 1 0 0 7
Alaska N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Arizona 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 6
Arkansas 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 10
California 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 3
Colorado 0 3 3 2 0 0 0 8
Connecticut 3 2 1 1 0 1 0 8
Delaware 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3
Florida 3 9 8 4 3 1 1 29
Georgia 0 4 1 2 2 0 0 9
Hawai’i N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idaho 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4
Illinois 2 7 1 3 0 2 1 16
Indiana 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 6
Iowa 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4
Kansas 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 6
Kentucky 6 2 3 2 2 0 0 15
Louisiana 1 1 3 2 1 0 0 8
Maine 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 5
Maryland 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 6
Massachusetts 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 7
Michigan 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3
Minnesota 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Mississippi 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 6
Missouri 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
Montana 1 2 3 0 0 1 0 7
Nebraska 4 3 5 2 0 0 0 14
Nevada 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3
New 
Hampshire
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
New Jersey 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 7
New Mexico 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
New York 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4
North 
Carolina
2 3 4 3 1 0 0 13
North Dakota 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Ohio 4 4 0 0 0 1 0 9
Oklahoma 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 7
Oregon 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3
Pennsylvania 5 8 1 1 0 0 1 15
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South 
Carolina
2 2 3 0 0 0 0 8
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South Dakota 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3
Tennessee 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 4
Texas 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 4
Utah 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 4
Vermont 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Virginia 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
Washington 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
West Virginia 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 5
Wisconsin 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 3
Wyoming 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
TOTAL 68 96 67 48 11 8 3
